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The Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) Program, 
authorized under Title I of the Housing and Community Development 
Act of 1974, as amended, provided a challenge to local communities 
to develop community development programs that would primarily 
benefit low-and-moderate-income persons in the decaying inner 
city. Because industrialized communities could not afford to 
provide scarce local dollars to improve declining neighborhoods, 
the CDBG Program attempted to take up this void.
As the CDBG Program matured, entitlement cities entered an 
era of uncertainty. Research into the successes, failures, and 
declining support of the CDGB Program, especially during the 
Reagan Administration, has given local communities reason to 
believe that the CDBG Program may be eliminated —  leaving, like 
many other programs for the poor, the priorities of the CDBG 
Program to compete for funding from state and local tax dollars.
The Focus of this paper will be on the review of the CDBG 
Entitlement Program through discussion of legislative history, 
research, evaluation, and a case study involving implementation of 
the CDGB Program and fund allocation in Flint, Michigan. The case 
study will pay particular attention to implementation of a housing 
rehabilitation program through the creation of the Flint 
neighborhood Improvement and Preservation Project, Inc. (Flint 
HIPP, Inc.), a 501(c)(3) non-profit organization, established as 
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COMMUUIITY DEVELOPMENT BLOCK GRANT - 
THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
In the United States, Federal Grants-in-aid that are provided
to local and state jurisdictions, while considered by some to be a
recent innovation, actually have a history back to the nineteenth
century. State Universities were given land that was granted to
their state by the Federal government. The New Deal, as part of
domestic policy, established cash grants. Truman was the first
President to establish a direct grant program to local government.
Prior to Truman, grants were made only to state governments.
The 1970's saw a large increase in intergovernmental fiscal
relationships by providing more direct grants to local
1jurisdictions. —  The birth of "New Federalism," through Block 
Grants.
The Federal role in community development and housing policy
have shared interests with powerful conservative lobbying groups
who have not had a strong- desire to use their funds to support
quality low income housing. Federal community development policy
has focused on "intergovernmental power relationships, as well as
a concern with the power relationships between the public and
2private sector."
There have been both negative and positive consequences of
3federal housing policy. Among negative consequences are:
(1) A consistently low level of resources <in relation to 
need) have been committed to housing and community 
development programs, both at the 'micro' level (i.e., 
excessive per unit cost restrictions and various other false 
economies) and at the level of aggregate spending;
2
(2) Feedback regarding the difficulties encountered by 
various programs has been used to argue for their curtailment 
or abolition rather than as knowledge useful for their 
improvement. Negative information becomes a weapon in the 
hands of program opponents, and proponents become reluctant 
to generate or disseminate such information; and
(3) Consistent fluctuations in program design, direction, and 
magnitude result from the ongoing struggle between opponents 
and proponents of government involvement.
On the positive side, one can recall E. E. Schatscheider*s
assertion that "any organization represents ’mobilisation of bias’
4which tends to discourage the full examination of alternatives.” 
Within Schatscheider's context, when the federal government reacts 
to a problem, organizational and program commitments are made. 
Legislators commit to a strategy that will enhance their image and 
administrators create client support to sustain their ego and
5career ambitions. However, when programs are carried out on the 
behalf of the disadvantaged by the more ’’privileged groups in the 
society,” history has shown that those ’’privileged public and 
private sector providers” have not acted in the best interest of 
the "program’s intended beneficiaries.” R, Allen Hays argues
that ”we cannot turn away from the problem nor allow a private 
sector takeover ideologically, only a positive and collective
7reaction can renew our commitment to the disadvantaged.”
Theoretical literature, according to Edward M. Graralichs' 
"Intergovernmental Grants,” does not have an empirical base 
because of the "lack of an underlying theory of the behavior of
Q
state and local governments.” In response to Gramlich, Richard 
P. Nathan, in the Spring of 1983 wrote an essay to help develop a 
predictive theory of behavior on local and state governments 
receiving federal grants.^
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Nathan identifies grants-in-aid as a bargaining process that
not only involves Washington, but also the local and state
government. He believes the best way to go about describing this
phenomenon is to identify a ’’horizontal policy bargaining process,
[that] consists of decision-making about policy goals and
instruments for the country as a whole, and a vertical dimension,
involving the way in which a particular grant is defined and
10executed by individual recipient jurisdictions,”
Nathan argues that the federal administrative system, in the
foreseeable future, is not adequate to run domestic programs
11without a grant-in-aid system.
When the Community Development Block Grant <CDBG) Program 
began, in 1974, the Ford Administration had a ’’hands off” policy 
which many local officials embraced. In 1977, local officials 
resisted Carter's ’’Targeting” of aid to the poor and distressed
neighborhoods. The Reagan Administration went back to the ’’hands
12off” policy that existed at the beginning of the CDBG program.
Based on the different ways the CDBG program has been
administered, Nathan believes, created a critical
13generalization:
The way the dominant political actors of a given recipient
jurisdiction perceive and treat a given federal grant often 
shapes its character.
Nathans’ study found that the way local officials used
vertical policy bargaining, caused a change in the horizontal or
national policy, which returned greater control over CDBG to local
14or state governments.
4
The political process, according to Nathan, involves three 
actor groups: 1) Generalists (governors, mayors, budget and
planning officials) 2) Specialist (those responsible for
15administering the grant); and 3) Special interest groups. In
the case of the CDBG program, the Generalists was the architect, 
and the Specialist, in administering the program, gained a great
deal of influence over how funds were to be expended —  primarily
16in housing rehabilitation and capital improvement projects.
Nathan establishes his second generalization from his
17description of the three actor groups:
The character of the vertical policy bargain on a particular
grant is likely to be strongly influenced by the group of
actors who dominate the decision-making of the recipient
jurisdiction for that grant.
The Fiscal variable is also an important consideration in how
the CDBG allocations were used. If local funds were limited, the
CDBG funds were merged, to provide basic services such as police,
fire, streets, and sewers. However, jurisdictions using this
1 Qfiscal policy, faced the following sanctioning factors:
1) Some federal administrators and auditors actively enforce 
requirements prohibiting the maintenance of existing programs 
and services with federal funds; 2) Local specialist officials 
and interest groups demand that federal funds intended for 
their programs actually be used for them; and 3) federal grant 
programs are identifiable.
Local jurisdictions, Nathan found, who kept the CDBG funds
separated, were more apt to adjust to federal cuts than those who
19merged CDBG with their general fund.
Nathan further found that local jurisdictions, who played by
20the rules, did so for the following reasons:
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1) officials of the recipient jurisdictions desire to be law 
abiding; 2) state and local officials share the views of 
federal officials as to the purposes of federal aid; and 3) 
generalists officials fear becoming dependent on federal aid 
because of the problems of funding unreliability and
instability.
As a result of the CDBG program, many local jurisdictions 
created or expanded Departments of Community Development and 
planning offices or agencies. The question of the 80's, concludes 
Nathan, is what will become of these departments and agencies as 
the CDBG program allocations continue to decrease or if the 
program is eliminated. This is where the horizontal and vertical 
dimensions will have its greatest impact —  not only on the fiscal
p 1variable but more Importantly on low income persons.
During the 60’s a strong liberal movement increased the 
Federal government’s involvement in providing large categorical 
grants to state and local governments. By the end of the decade, 
however, major concerns were expressed by both liberal and 
conservative groups. The number, complexity, duplication and 
chaos caused by Categorical programs (programs having a particular 
intent) forced the Federal government into looking at program
consolidation and altering the Federal community development
22strategy.
In developing a framework that explains the initiatives that 
led to the block grant concept and a policy of decentralization 
for federal grants-in-aid, in the 1970s, consideration must be
given to those who formulated policy, administered, and reviewed
23its predecessor —  Categorical Grants of the 1960s.
The usual process, in creating Categorical Grants, was to
identify a problem and then establish a response program on the
national level. The President proposed programs with input from
administration advisors, special interest groups, public agencies,
and influencing the programs ultimately approved by Congress. A
Federal agency was given authority to administer the program and
develop the regulations to implement the program, often with input
24from special interests.
In many instances, political commitments were made that
passed administration of programs to state and local jurisdictions
25or nonprofit corporations. This process created conflicts
between local and federal authorities. Federal agencies
controlled local programs through complex review and technical
26requirements with specific timetables.
Even with the conflicts, local jurisdictions became
proficient in dealing with federal requirements and actively
sought continuation of programs to keep categorical grant funds
27flowing into their communities. Thus, according to R. Allen
Hays, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University
28of Northern Iowa, categorical programs
created the pattern of vertical, functional integration of 
categorical areas of governmental activity to which former 
North Carolina Governor Terry Sanford gave the name ’picket 
fence federalism, * . . .with each categorical program 
[representing] not only a coalition at the federal level, but 
an alliance between agencies and interest groups at all 
levels of government with a common interest in the survival 
of the program.
7
Local jurisdictions, however, continued to resist federal
involvement in local decision-making creating increased, though
unsuccessful, presidential intervention. The Kennedy and Johnson
Administrations saw the need to authorize an umbrella organization
to coordinate low income programs, thus creating the Office of
Economic Opportunity and the Model Cities Administration. Federal
agencies resisted their coordination efforts even before they got
to the local level,^
Further erosion of categorical programs resulted from
continuing frustration of Federal control over local programs,
inability of federally funded neighborhood based organizations to
impact on policy, and the intense competition between large local
governments who had the financial ability to develop expert staffs
30and political influence and small poorer communities.
These conflicts gave rise to the concept of revenue sharing.
Liberal economist Walter Heller was the first to argue ’’that the
expansive and flexible tax mechanisms available to state and local
governments necessitated a continuing federal role in financially
31aiding these governments.” However, Heller also supported
giving states and local communities more control over programs to
allow greater creativity in developing programs to meet their
, 32needs.
The Johnson Administration appointed a commission to study 
the revenue sharing concept, but did not publish the results 
because he did not like the idea. In 1967, the Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations supported a revenue
8
sharing program, resulting in a number of bills being introduced
in Congress. When Richard Nixon took office in 1969, revenue
sharing had been supported by the National Conference of
Governors, the National Conference of Mayors, the National
Conference of State Legislative Leaders, and the National
33Association of Counties.
The Nixon Administration strongly supported a revenue sharing
program by stressing three major themes. First, he critized the
amount of aid going to disadvantaged groups through expansion of
categorical grants. In August 1969, he proposed the ”New
Federalism” program, that included revenue sharing, by stating
that .a majority of Americans no longer support the continued
extension of federal services. The momentum for federal expansion
34has passed its peak: a process of deceleration has set in.”
Second, he attacked the federal bureaucracy in a speech, later in
1969, by offering that ”the problems of the cities and the
countryside stubbornly resisted the solutions of Washington.”
With no Congressional action on his proposals, during his 1972
reelection campaign, Nixon again attacked the Federal system by
asking ”Do we want to turn more power over to the bureaucrats in
Washington in the hope that they will do what is best for all the
people? Or do we want to return more power to the people and to
their state and local governments, so that the people can decide
35what is best for themselves.” Third, revenue sharing was linked
to the idea of returning control to local communities through
reduced influence by federal agencies, local agencies influence
36over Federal agencies and strengthen local political control.
9
The Nixon Administration's initiative included two basic 
revenue sharing concepts* One would be a virtually unrestricted 
general revenue sharing grant to state and local communities and 
the other would be special revenue sharing or block grant fund 
that would replace categorical programs. He proposed six
functional areas for block grants: health, education, police,
manpower, medical care, transportation, and community
development. ̂
In early 1972, Congress adopted the concept of general
revenue sharing by authorizing The State and Local Fiscal
Assistance Act. The Act passed when Wilber Mills, who was chairman
of the powerful House Ways and Means Committee, finally agreed to
report it out of committee due to strong lobbying from the White
House and special interest groups. Mills had led the opposition
38because of loss of accountability and Federal control.
The proposed special revenue sharing or block grant program
received even greater opposition, especially from those concerned
with aid to minorities and the poor. Walter Hundly, Director of
the Seattle Model Cities program strongly opposed the block grant
concept by stating:^9
I am convinced that the only real salvation for the 
disadvantaged, and for poor blacks in particular, is the 
direct intervention of the Federal government. Local
political pressures militate against giving to blacks any 
priority for public monies, as the federal special impact 
programs do now. That’s why local government is not ready for 
the burdens which Nixon wants to give it.
Former Johnson Administration HEW Secretary, Wilber Cohen, in 
supporting categorical programs argued:
10
If Ehrlichman’ s criteria is, solve the problem slower, and 
maybe a little more cheaply, with more local people... that’s 
one statement of the problem. But I wouldn’t state the 
problem that way...in the kind of society we have...we’ve got 
a lot of social problems, and we've got to deal with them 
through strong, federal action.
The Nixon Administration was unable to move the proposed
special revenue sharing program for transportation, health,
education, and law enforcement because of a Democratic Congress
and influence of special interests and Federal agencies supporting
the concept of categorical grants. Congress did, however, show
41support for manpower and community development block grants.
Political support surfaced for the community development
block grant proposal because (1) local government officials, a
strong lobby in Washington, saw the opportunity to enhance
physical development projects, and <2) Nixon appealed directly to
middle class residents of central cities, suburban communities and
small towns and cities that had little concern for programs
42directed to the poor and minority population.
In April of 1971, Nixon made his first strong push for a 
community development revenue sharing program that would 
consolidate urban renewal, model cities and neighborhood 
facilities programs, under a formula grant to each local 
jurisdiction, reduce federal involvement in administration of the 
grant funds, and give local jurisdictions the decision-making
A. ̂function to determine how funds should be allocated.
Congress made no progress on the proposed community 
development block grant in 1971 and 1972. After reelection, in 
1973, Nixon began his strongest push by declaring a Moratorium on
11
housing programs in January, 1973. In March, 1973, the Nixon
Administration proposed the "Better Communities Act," which 
contained three additional programs: open spaces, water and sewer
grants, and public facility loans, and a "hold-harmless” provision 
that would protect communities receiving large categorical 
grants.44
In the State of the Union Address, on February 2, 1973,
45Richard Nixon stated:
We must do a better job in community development —  in
creating more livable communities in which all of our children 
can grow up with fuller access to opportunity and greater 
immunity to the social evils and blights which now plague so 
many of our towns and cities.
Congress did not begin action on the community development
block grant proposal until the Fall of 1973 when Nixon presented
his housing program. Underlying the delay were arguments
generated from old debates, between housing and community
development supporters, that began in the 1940s under the "New
Deal," the Moratorium, and the many disagreements on the new 
46program.
President Nixon, in his State of the Union Address, on
January 30, 1974, again addressed Community Development to a
Congress that had not acted upon his housing program. He
47stated:
The current way of providing most federal aid to communities, 
with each dollar tied to a string pulled and manipulated by a 
federal planner,is wrong...We have recognized that the federal 
policy that will work best is one that helps the people of a 
particular community define their own needs and meet those 
needs in the way they consider best. . . I once again urge 
passage of the Better Communities Act. . .a $2.3 billion bill. . . 
This legislation would consolidate seven categorical grant
12
programs into a single program. Funds would be distributed 
on the basis of need...Two Congresses have now addressed 
community development legislation. . .
During the Hearings, that began in October, 1973, the House
48considered the following resolutions:
HR7277: The Better Communities Act Administrative Bill—
Federal Revenues to State and local government which would 
afford broad discretion; HR10036: Housing and Urban
Development Act 1973 - To establish a program of community 
development and housing block grants, consolidate, simplify 
and improve laws relating to housing and urban development 
activities; HR20688: Housing Act of 1973 - Administrative Bill 
- To improve and simplify laws relating to housing and housing 
assistance; HR20689: Private Mortgage Insurance Guarantee Act
1973 - To provide for the guarantee of private mortgage 
insurance.
The Senate Bill, S243-2, under jurisdiction of the Housing 
and Banking Committee considered an Omnibus bill covering a broad 
range of Federal housing and urban development programs which 
would consolidate and simplify existing programs and develop 
several new programs including Community Development Block Grant.
The Bill would: ̂
1) Consolidate existing FHA Mortgage Insurance 
programs with safeguards to protect recipients from 
defective homes;
2) Consolidate community development programs 
including Model Cities and Urban Renewal into one new 
block grant with two year contracts to State and Local 
governments.
3) Revise low rent public housing and comprehensive
planning assistance programs;
4) Liberalize rural housing to facilitate Farmers
Home Administration aid; and
5) Establish mobile home construction and safety
standards and financing assistance for consumer 
oriented housing cooperatives.
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Testifying before both the Senate and House subcommittees,
were many public and private officials, who covered a wide range
of interests and priorities. The Hearings, which took place
during October, 1973, heard testimony from such individuals as:
James T. Lynn, Secretary of HUD, who objected to linking housing
and community development programs to proposed funding for other
housing programs; Robert Turner, President of the International
City Managers Association, spoke in favor of HR10036; John
Lindsay, Mayor of New York City, favored the distribution between
housing and urban renewal programs in the administration of the
community development block grant program; Milton Shapp, Governor
of Pennsylvania, urged a strong role for State governments in
administration of the Community Development Block Grant Program;
Maxine Kurtz, representing the Board of Governors of the American
Institute of Planners emphasized the importance of the planning
functions in housing programs; Lawrence Lane, Legislative Council
for American Association of Retired Persons testified that the
programs did not sufficiently address the needs of the elderly;
and several representatives for civil rights groups and
organizations testified on the need for housing for minorities,
50women and low income persons.
In a joint brief, supplemental views of Senator Tower,
Packwood and Brock were entered into the Senate record. They 
51argued that:
The bill reflects the fact that major housing and urban
development legislation has been delayed many years, with the 
last comprehensive bill enacted in 1968. It is a long and 
complex measure, presenting an almost bewildering array of
14
proposals, some old, some new, many highly complex. By its 
nature, it will be a very difficult bill for the Congress to 
grasp and deal with in detail.
Other than the Chapter dealing with community development and
comprehensive planning, most of the bill deals in one way or the
other with housing...In addition to simplification, the Committee
made substantive decisions in housing policy and approved numerous
52specific changes in existing law.
In Chapter III, community development represented the
Committee’s continuing effort to work out legislation that would
consolidate several narrow and fragmented community development
authorities into a single program of Federal assistance for
53community development.
The provisions for allocation of funds— despite some basic
problems— at least no longer appears to guarantee that a community
will continue to receive funding; a gradual phasedown of prior
assistance levels became possible. On the whale, however, the
community development provisions of the bill fell far short of
expectations, of Federally supported housing programs, envisioned 
54by supporters.
One example of the new limitations that restrict local
discretion is a provision which prohibits a community from using
more than 20 percent of its grants for activities that are not of
"direct and significant" benefit to low or moderate income
families or to areas that are presently blighted and 
55deteriorating The fact remains that the provision, with all the 
potential uncertainties as to what benefits are both direct and
15
important, may become a source of widespread contention and
56controversy, with artificial boundaries having to be drawn.
Another limitation requires that not more than 20 percent of the
57funds, in any two-year period be used for public services. In
addition, the requirement that recipients of funds contribute 10
percent local share adds one more potential burden of Federal
58review and audit.
Senator Robert Taft, Jr. , who left the Banking Committee for
another assignment, was allowed to testify because he had been an
essential participant in formulation of the bill. Senator Taft
testified that:^
The Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 was enacted with 
such high expectations that President Johnson was moved to 
label it a potential ”Magna Charta” which could liberate our 
cities. If nothing else, this bill has thus far been spared 
similar rhetoric. .. this bill is of necessity evolutionary and 
not revolutionary. , .
The proposed consolidation of ten categorical grants, which
have existed as totally separate programs, would be a large step
forward. Besides the obvious elimination of red tape, communities
would no longer be forced to fragment their planning and
development efforts for the purpose of obtaining federal funds.
However, to accompany the increased local flexibility, resulting
from the merger of these programs, a clear federal directive was
60needed to channel, but not mandate, the use of funds.
Conference Report MO. 93-1279 - Joint Explanatory Statement
61of the Committee of Conference, stated:
The managers on the part of the house and Senate on the 
disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment of the 
House to the Senate Bill <S.3066) to consolidate, simplify,
16
and improve laws relative to housing and housing assistance, 
to provide federal assistance in support of community 
development activities, and for other purposes, submit the 
following joint statement to the House and the Senate in 
explanation of the effect the action agreed upon by the 
managers and recommended in the accompanying conference 
report:
I. Community Development —  Findings and Objectives
The Senate Bill contained findings that <1> the Nation’s 
communities face critical problems resulting from urban 
population growth, concentration of lower income persons in 
central cities, and inadequate public and private investment; 
and (2) the Nation’s welfare depends on establishing and 
maintaining viable urban communities. It also established the 
development of viable urban communities, by providing economic 
opportunities, principally for persons of low and moderate 
income; and stated that the objective was to be achieved 
through the elimination of slums and blight and conditions 
detrimental to health, safety, and welfare, conservation and 
expansion of housing and housing opportunities; increased 
public services, improved use of land, increased neighborhood 
diversity, and preservation of property with special value.
The House amendment set forth the purpose of the title as 
furthering the development of a national growth policy by 
consolidating certain programs into a system which <1) 
provides assistance annually— with maximum certainty and 
minimum delay, <2) encourages community development activities 
consistent with local and areawide planning, <3) furthers 
achievement of national housing goals, and (4) provides for 
coordinated and mutually supportive housing and community 
development activities.
Effective Date
The Senate bill provided that the new community development 
program would begin upon enactment of the bill. The house 
amendment provided that the new program would begin January 1, 
1975. The conference report contains the House provision...
The Senate report was issued February 27, 1974; the house
report was issued June 17, 1974; the House conference report was
issued August 12, 1974; the Dates of consideration and passage in
the Senate was March 11, and August 13, 1974; the House, June 20,
and August 25, 1974...The Senate bill was passed in lieu of the
House bill.62
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63Managers on the part of the House were:
Wright Patman; W, A. Barett; Leonor K. Sullivan; Thomas L. 
Ashly; William S. Moorhead; Robert G. Stephens, Jr.; Gernand 
St.Germain; Henry S. Reuss; Richard B. Widnall; Garry Brown;
J. William Stanton; Ben B. Blackburn; and Margaret Heckler; 
And
Managers on the part of the Senate were;
John Sparkman; William Proxmire; Harrison A. Williams; Alan
Cranston; Thomas J. McIntyre; John Tower; Edward W. Brooke; 
Bill Brock; and Wallace F. Bennett
The Housing and Community development Act of 1974 provided
authorization for 24 programs, including HUD housing programs,
rural housing programs, the new consolidated community development
program and comprehensive planning programs. ̂
Chapter III of the bill consolidated ten categorical
development programs into a single block grant program established
65by the Community Development Assistance Act of 1974, The
66primary objective of the bill was:
The development of viable urban communities through the 
provision of decent housing, suitable living environments and 
expansion of economic opportunities, principally for persons 
of low and moderate income.
Consistent with the primary objective of the Act, federal
assistance was provided for the support of activities which were
67directed toward:
Elimination of slums and blight and preventing the 
deterioration of property; elimination of conditions which are 
detrimental to health, safety and public welfare; conserving 
and expanding the nation's housing stock; expanding and 
improving the quality and quantity of public services; 
achieving better use of land and other natural resources; 
increasing the diversity and vitality of neighborhoods; and 
restoring and preserving urban property of special value for 
historic, architectural or esthetic reasons.
13
The community development program replaced ten development 
programs administered by HUD: The Public Facilities Loan program
authorized by Title II of the housing amendments of 1965; Open 
Space program authorized by Title VII of the Housing Act of 1961; 
Planning Advance Program authorized by Section 702 of the housing 
Act of 1954; Vater-Sewer, Neighborhood facilities and Advanced 
Land Acquisition programs authorized under Title VII of the 
Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965; Urban Renewal, Code 
Enforcement and Neighborhood Development Programs authorized by 
Title I of the Housing Act of 1949; and the Model Cities program 
authorized by Title I of the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan 
Development Act of 1966.^
69The Act has three broad national objectives:
1) To benefit low and moderate income families;
2) Aid in the prevention or elimination of slums or 
blight; and
3) To meet other community development needs having 
a particular urgency because existing conditions 
pose a serious and immediate threat to the health 
or welfare of the community where other financial 
resources are not available to meet such needs.
The Community Development Block Grant program is a formula
grant that provides assistance to Entitlement Cities (those with a
population of 50,000 or more); Urban Counties; and discretionary
funds for small cities. Entitlement Cities received 80% of the
allocated funds; 2% to small cities and other related programs
selected by the Secretary of Hud; and the remainder to Urban 
70Counties.
19
The ratios, to determine funding levels, took into
consideration the population of a city or urban county and the
population of all cities or urban counties; the extent of poverty
in that city or urban county and the extent of poverty in all
cities and urban counties; and the extent of housing overcrowding
in a city or urban county and the extent of housing overcrowding
71in all cities and urban counties.
The formula concept created a bitter struggle over the
redistributive nature of the program. Categorical grant
recipients, who had received large allocations, would stand a good
chance of reduced federal aid under the Community Development
72Block Grant Program.
73Critics had three basic objections:
1) The underlying concept of a formula distribution system 
was attacked as unfair. The Senate's housing subcommittee
concluded that, due to the complexity and variety of urban 
problems, no formula could accurately determine whether one 
city had a greater need for community development than
another;
2) Criticism was directed at the type of data used to rate 
communities according to formula. . .the U.S. Census, [because] 
the Census systematically undercounted blacks and other urban 
minorities...by the Census Bureau's own admission that it had 
undercounted blacks by 7.7 percent in 1970, in contrast to a 
1.9 percent undercount for whites. Also, inaccuracies would
occur due to the ten year time lag between censuses; and
3) Protests were raised about the immediate impact of 
conversion to the formula on cities currently enjoying much 
higher levels of funding under categorical programs.
While the Nixon Administration did not want an expansion of
the "hold-harmless” provision, the Act provided for a six year
program. The first three years provided a hold-harmless grant to
jurisdictions using categorical grants based on prior funding
levels. During the next three years, each year would be reduced a
20
754third, until the entitlement was attained in the sixth year.
An even greater struggle resulted over the issue of local
control. Nixon wanted a "no strings attached" program, however,
both the House and Senate opposed this concept. Congress accused
the Administration of "more Watergate arrogance." Nixon, again,
75reluctantly supported a "general level of federal oversight."
The Bill that finally passed required communities to submit
an annual application that HUD had 75 days to review. The
application was automatically approved unless HUD found "the needs
and objectives described in the plan are ’plainly inconsistent*
with available facts and data," or the activities were "clearly
76impermissible or inappropriate."
Richard Nixon resigned the Presidency the month the Housing
and Community Development Act of 1974 was past. Gerald Ford, in
77signing the Act on August 22, 1974, stated:
This bill is of far-reaching and perhaps historic significance 
for it not only helps to boost the long-range prospects for 
the housing market but also marks a complete and welcome 
reversal in the way that America tries to solve the problems 
of our urban communities. ..This bill climaxes years of effort 
to replace the rigid programs of the past [by] providing 
communities with greater certainty about the level of federal 
funding. . ♦ ; distributing federal funds to communities 
according to what they need rather than who they know; 
replacing federal judgments on local development with the 
judgments of the people who live and work there; and allowing 
local officials to concentrate on comprehensive programs for 
community betterment instead of grant applications for 
individual projects.
R. Allen Hays, of the State University of New York, provides 
the following overview on passage of the Community Development
7 ABlock Grant Program:
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The passage of the Housing and Community Development Act in 
August, 1974, clearly set a new direction in community 
development policy. The federal government would not be
totally uninvolved in urban areas, as it has been before the 
Depression, yet, at the same time, the influence of political 
and administrative judgments at the national level would be 
reduced in favor of greater local control...The conversion to 
Community Development Block Grants may, thus, be seen as a 
correction of the balance of power...To be sure, blacks would 
never again be as underrepresented as they had been before the 
1960s.
When the Nixon Administration proposed the Community
Development Block Grant program, in 1971, it was to be a special
revenue sharing allocation to entitlement cities of over 50,000
population. The program was distributive through a weighted
formula that considered population (25%); and targeting was
accomplished by weighting the level poverty <50%) and overcrowding
in housing <25%). However, when the bill was adopted, Congress
included urban counties. This change resulted in an increase,
from 445 entitlement cities, to 590 entitlement cities and
79counties, when the bill was adopted in 1974.
Shortly after the CDBG program was implemented, the Brookings
Institution conducted a study that revealed that the program was
too poverty oriented and did not consider population lag and the
8 0deterioration of infrastructure.
In the late 70*s, the Carter Administration’s urban policy
statement called for targeting federal aid. The Community 
Development Block Grant program was the benchmark for this policy. 
In 1977 the Carter Administration was successful in having 
Congress approve a dual formula that would shift funding from
affluent communities, receiving CDBG funds, to older and
declining, Northeast and Midwest industrial centers. ̂
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In 1977, Congress, while keeping the original formula, added
a second weighted formula. The additional weighted formula took
into consideration pre-1940 housing <50%); poverty (30%); and
82growth lag (20%). The net result increased the Northeast and
Midwest regions from 49% to 59%; central cities 59%; and smaller
83cities decreased from 28% to 10%, under the dual formula.
In 1980, the Senate Oversight Committee on the Housing and 
Community Development Act of 1974, observed that some communities 
have been critized for expending CDBG funds in "the more 
transitional, modest-income areas where the degree of
deterioration calls for relatively marginal public improvements,
84rather than to the severely deteriorating neighborhoods."
During Hearings held by the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on
Housing and Urban Affairs of the Committee on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs, on the 1980 renewal of the Housing and Community
Development Act, Frank Steiner, Executive Director of the Michigan
85Housing Coalition, testified:
On the whole, the programs were not geared to addressing severe 
blight and slum conditions. This finding is consistent with the 
House Subcommittee’s 1977 staff report, which found "relatively 
few instances in which available community development funds 
were targeted for the worst areas of their communities."
Catherine Lovell of the University of California, Riverside
took a look at the role of federal requirements during the first
six years of the CDGB program. She concentrated on the aspects of
8§low income targeting and citizens participation.
From the 1974 legislation, Lovell cited Section 104(b)<2) 
which required "maximum feasible priority to activities which will
23
benefit low—and—moderate-income families or aid in the prevention
of slums and blight," and Section 101(c) that requires CDBG funds
87benefit "principally persons of low-and-moderate-income." The
only guidance that came from HUD was to define low—income as less
than 50 percent of the median income and moderate income to be
between 51 and 80 percent of the median income as defined by the
SMSA. "Maximum feasible priority," and "principally benefits"
were not defined by HUD, leaving local communities with little
guidance to determine the focus of their CDBG funds. A Brookings
Institution monitoring report stated "Thus, at the Federal level,
the amount of social targeting desired became a matter of the
88policy preference of those administering the program."
Lovell noted that Patricia Harris, new HUD Secretary under
Carter, announced in February, 1977 that her Department would give
the highest priority to programs that benefited low—and-moderate-
89income persons. Brookings monitors pointed out that their
research found from the third year, after Harris took over as HUD 
Secretary, HUD took a more active role in ensuring funds primarily 
benefited low-and-moderate-income persons. And that, during the 
third and fourth years of the Carter Administration, low-income 
targeting became a dominant issue between HUD and local 
communities. 90
The Brookings study also found that there were three
91important policy variables influencing CDBG programs:
1) The wording of the law;
2) HUD preferences in enforcing the statutory guidelines; and
3) Citizen Participation
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The 1974 Act required communities to provide citizens with
the "opportunity to participate." In 1977, the Act was amended to
require local communities to develop a Citizen Participation Plan
that would allow citizen comment and participation of low-income
persons from targeted neighborhoods. While HUD regulations
provided no additional guidance, citizen participation took three
general forms: 1) advisory committees, 2) neighborhood based
groups, and 3) special or public interest group involvement (such
92as the Urban League and the League of Women Voters). While the
Brookings study did not attempt to determine any connection
between strength or form of citizen participation and targeting of
low-and-moderate-income benefits, they did find that the influence
93of local citizens did affect the CDBG program.
Lovell argues that with the shift of the CDBG nonentitlement
program to State control and the Carter Administration’s policy to
94minimize reporting through reduced paperwork:
All of the "old" new federalism grants, including CDBG, had
characteristics in common, which, taken together with the 
decentralization emphasis, have contributed significantly to 
political change and have made the question of the role of 
agency enforcement even more crucial. The most important of
these characteristics was the distribution of block grants on 
the basis of entitlement rather than on the basis of grant 
applications...The new federalism has, in effect, enticed a 
whole new group of general purpose local governments, who had 
had minimal relationships with the federal government before, 
into direct federal-local partnerships and made the local 
governments active implementors of nationally determined 
policies. Under the block grant programs, local political 
jurisdictions, whether new or experienced on the federal aid 
scene, were nudged to take responsibility for the disadvantaged 
or low income people in their communities. As a result, an 
important degree of value development and value homogenization 
across local governments may have taken place.
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On June 11, 1981 a Senate Hearing was held before the
Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations of the Committee on
Governmental Affairs. The Hearing covered the GAO report, "The
Community Development Block Grant Program can be more effective in
Revitalizing the nation's Cities." In his opening statement,
Senator Dave Duirenberger, Chairman of the Subcommittee, argued
that the CDBG program was not intended to be a revenue sharing
program, but one that benefited low-and-moderate income persons
from inner-city neighborhoods. The program was to provide
flexibility to local jurisdictions, while preserving the
government's purpose to award formula grants to entitlement
communities. However, Senator Duirenberger pointed out, that two
years into the program, the formula failed to sufficiently target
the program to the intended recipients. The 1977 Congressional
reauthorization of the CDBG program and HUD regulations redirected
95its focus to targeting.
In testifying before the Subcommittee, Henry Eschwege,
Director of the Community and Economic Development Division in the
General Accounting Office <GAO), found that the decisions made at
the local level do not always meet Federal perceptions "on how to
best meet revitalization needs." The GOA review of the CDBG
96program identified four issues:
1) the desirability of having all grantees concentrate their 
Block Grant funds in distressed geographic areas small enough 
so that visible improvements can be achieved in a reasonable 
time period; 2) Retaining the broad list of activities 
currently eligible, or instead, having grantees focus 
activities on the cities' most urgent revitalization needs; 3) 
continuing to allow grantees to decide who can receive Block 
Grant supported rehabilitation or specifying income
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eligibility requirements programwide; 4) whether there is a 
need to limit eligible rehabilitation work to that which is 
essential to restore a housing unit to a safe, decent, and 
sanitary condition, or whether other items of lesser priority 
should continue to be eligible.
Representatives from The National Citizens1 Monitoring
Project of the Working Group for Community Development Reform,
testified before the Subcommittee on their findings of a 30 month
evaluation of the CDGB program. The study evaluated the
performance of over 70 entitlement jurisdictions, which included 9
out of 10 of the largest entitlement grants and a cross-section of
entitlement cities and urban counties. The Projects' membership
included the National Urban League, the National Council of
LaRaza, the League of Women Voters, the National Low Income
Housing Coalition, the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, the
Legal Services Task Force of CDGB, and the Center for Community 
97Change.
The Project was funded by a Title IX grant from the Community 
Services Administration, that requires an agency evaluation of the
Q oimpact of non-CSA programs for the poor.
The Project study found, that while housing rehabilitation
was the top priority in Neighborhood Strategy Areas CNSAs), "Low
income residents [were! reluctant to apply for rehabilitation
assistance [because] some who applied were rejected because they
could not financially present themselves to prevailing bank
99requirements for loans,”
Further, the Project monitors’ found, in some rehabilitation
4 . V  4- 100programs, that:
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1) information about the program’s goals and objectives and 
performance were inadequate and/or unavailable;
2) there were inadequate or poorly trained staff;
3) there were long delays of as many as 4 years in getting 
the program underway;
4) specific complaints were cited about high administrative 
costs, In one program an auditoi— general’s report indicated 
that for every S3 spent on rehabilitation, S2 were spent on 
administration;
5) a major complaint was the poor quality of the
rehabilitation that took place. The complaints ranged from
poor materials, to poor work quality, to incomplete work;
6) monitors raised serious questions about actual benefit to 
low-and moderate-income persons;
7) on the whole the programs were not geared to addressing 
severe blight and slum conditions. This finding is consistent 
with the House Subcommittee’s 1977 staff report which found 
’relatively few instances in which available community 
development funds were targeted for the worst areas of their 
communities; ’
8) a majority of the programs were designed to rehabilitate 
owner-occupied homes, even though most of the community’s low- 
and moderate-income residents are renters;
9) programs showed poor record of minority participation and 
affirmative action; and
10) displacement is likely to occur as a result of one-third 
of the programs evaluated.
In concluding their testimony, Project representatives stated
that ”if there is a failure in the CDGB program, it is the
inadequacy of local governments to develop meaningful priorities
101in the elimination of blight and slums.” They recommended:
1) of the abuses of Federal spending by local governments, 
among the most repulsive for an American citizen to witness is 
the reckless manner in which CDBG funds are squandered, and 
the colossal insulting attitude in which the Federal
government is permitted to be ignored and deceived by blatant 
disregard of its laws and regulations;
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2) one must consider CDGB not only as a contract between the 
Federal government and local jurisdictions but most 
importantly as a contract of confidence between the taxpayers;
3) targeted USAs should be crystal clear in routing benefits 
to low-income communities. The projects should be targeted to 
those low-income areas within specific census tracts;
4> if grants to benefit low-income communities cannot be
assured through a stronger system of control by the Federal 
government, it seems fair to return all such funding to the 
taxpayer and to discontinue such Federal funding and/or local 
j urisdictions;
5) HUD should seriously explore and investigate a more direct 
method of funding directly to communities through recognized 
organizations working within the communities; and
6) incentive supplements should be available for those 
jurisdictions that can document an improved performance for 
the poor, as well as a better implementation and targeting of 
community development activities to lower income persons.
The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 has been
amended several times, but the first major revision occurred in
response to President Reagan’s "Program for Economic Recovery."
On August 13, 1981, Congress passed the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act. This Act consolidated over fifty categorical
programs into nine block grants: four in health services; three
in social services, one in education, and one in community
development. This fell short of Reagan’s proposal to consolidate
102over fifty categorical programs into four block grants.
Another major revision allowed state governments to assume 
administrative responsibility for the small cities portion of the 
block grant program. Small cities, with populations under 50,000, 
received 30% of the total block grant program allocation under 
this amendment. The Reconciliation Act also provided for several 
miscellaneous procedural changes in grant processing and 
application.
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In 1981, Rutgers University conducted a study that ranked
cities, using a measurement of urban hardship, to identify
problems with the needs-based dual formula of the CDBG program.
Rutgers’ study found:104
The urban distress measures have a high level of consistency 
in ranking the hardship of a common set of cities. Despite 
differences in their variable selection/expression and 
statistical treatment, the distress measures are similar in
their practical operation or throughout, namely the ordering
of urban distress. City hardship therefore appears to be
largely independent of the mechanism from which it is
determined.
In September, 1982 the Inspector General of the U. S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development began an Internal
audit - Survey of Planning, Management Development, and
Administrative Costs in the Community Development Block Grant
(CDBG) Program, because of concerns expressed by Congress over
local CDBG Administrative expenditures. Since enactment of the
1978 HUD Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, a ceiling of 20
percent was set for planning and administrative costs on any grant
made under Section 103(a) of Title I of the Housing and Community
Development Act of 1974. According to the background information
105contained in the final audit:
The house Appropriations committee was concerned about the 
amount of CDBG funds being expended for nonprogram activities 
which were defined as: (1) the development of a
comprehensive community development plan as well as a policy- 
planning management capacity to facilitate proper program 
implementation; and (2) the payment of reasonable
administrative costs and carrying charges related to planning 
and execution of community development and housing activities. 
Historically, HUD program staff have had two basic means of 
evaluating grantee compliance with the 20 percent limitation 
on planning, management development, and administrative costs;
(1) review of the grant application; (2) on-site monitoring; 
and in March 1983, a third means was added: A review of the 
Grantee Performance Report.
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The audit was conducted at the Seattle and Portland Area HUD
offices and included two grantees from each Area Office
Jurisdiction across the country. The audit included review of
legislative history and interviews with HUD officials. The audit
covered the period between June 1979 and September 1982. The
audit took place between September 14 to December 29, 1982. The
objectives of the survey were to evaluate;
(1) the propriety of administrative costs charged by selected 
grantees; (2) the extent to which administrative costs have 
been misclassified as activity costs; and <3) program 
requirements to see if adjustments may be made to simplify 
both the application of the 20 percent cost limitation and the 
ability of HUD to monitor compliance.
The HUD Inspector General Audit found that ”HUD regulations
lack adequate control over planning, management development, and
administrative costs incurred by CDBG program grantees.” The HUD
guidelines did not provide adequate direction to either Field
Offices or grantees, resulting in confusion over proper
identification of costs. The Inspector General recommended that
HUD revise its definition of administrative costs and issued
detailed guidelines to better control CDBG expenditures so more
funds could be directed to low-and-moderate income persons. The
Inspector General praised the 1983 adoption of a revised Grantee
Performance Report (GPR) because "the amount of funds expended
during each program year for general administrative and planning
107costs can be measured against the 20 percent limitation.
The Inspector Generals’ Audit cited two cases, involving a 
’’legal” misuse of program funds, to stress the importance of 
revisions in HUD guidelines. In the first case, a grantee
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allocated 82.8 percent or $24,606,596 of its program funds to a
local public agency to complete a parking facilities program. The
parking agency expended $768,000 in administrative type cost
without little actual progress being made on the planned project.
Their administrative costs were charged to activity rather than
1being applied to the 20 percent limitation. In another audit,
they found that a grantee had expended $3,830,222 or 100 percent 
of its budget for personnel and administrative costs; expended 
only $1,185,350 or 24 percent for program costs; and accomplished 
only 15.8 percent of its planned housing activities. Both cases 
were cited to illustrate how expenditures for administration do 
not keep up with program progress by ’’allowing an exclusion from
the limitation for administrative costs charged to an individual
109’’activity. ”
The HUD Inspector General cited a letter of November 11, 
1982, from HUD’s Office of General Council from the City of
Kansas, City, Kansas, to illustrate grantee frustrations over HUD
1 1 0guidelines:
It should be noted that this rule discourages efficient, less 
costly consolidation of staff functions and program services 
since ’multi-activity' functions are defined as administration 
costs, and single activity functions are assigned to non- 
administrative cost items.
On March 22, 1983 Congress passed the Emergency Jobs
Appropriations Bill. This Bill provided an additional $1.25
Billion to the block grant program with the intent to create
80,000 jobs and be used for ’’brick and mortar” projects in such
areas as housing rehabilitation, parks and historic preservation,
street repair and public construction that could be started within
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six months. However, because of political pressure, HUD was
forced to get the funding authority to local jurisdictions, with
little advanced planning. While the intent was to create
immediate jobs to the benefit low and moderate income persons,
implementation and length of the projects identified by local
111officials, greatly affected the intent of the appropriation.
In the Summer of 1983, Henry J. Schmandt, George D. Wendle
and George Otte of St. Louis University wrote an article titled
"CDGB: Continuity or Change.” They argued that when the shift to
block grants from categorical grants occurred, it did not
eliminate ’’problems or goal conflicts” associated with urban
programs to revitalize decaying cities. In fact, new federalism
112generated many unanswered questions:
1) Should redevelopment activities be concentrated in a few 
geographic sections of the community or dispersed more widely?
2) Should priority be accorded neighborhoods or marginal 
quality or those most severely deteriorated?
3) How can the need for neighborhood rehabilitation and the 
attendant displacement of poor families be reconciled?
4) To what extent can the demand for short-run benefits be 
balanced with the need for long-range plans and strategies?
5) Can urban development programs simultaneously pursue the 
goals of upgrading neighborhoods and spatially deconcentrating 
the poor and racial minorities?
One of the more highly debated concepts, under the CDGB
program, has been Targeting - the channeling of program benefits
to designated income groups or specific geographic areas of a
community. During the Carter Administration the buzz word was
"social targeting.” At first, Carter insisted the funds be
allocated to the poor no matter where they lived in a community.
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Later in hie Administration, Carter changed to "Spatial targeting"
by emphasizing concentration of CDGB funding in low income
neighborhoods. When the Reagan Administration came into power,
they relaxed the targeting policy and left the issue of
distribution of CDBG funds to the local community as long as it
113complied with the general objectives of the CDBG program.
Schmandt, Wendel and Otte concluded that The Community
114Development Block Grant Program:
has neither met the full expectations of its sponsors nor 
confirmed the worst fears of its opponents. It has given
local communities greater flexibility in designing their 
revitalization plans; but it has not distinguished itself by 
innovative programming or effective tailoring of activities to 
serve local needs. Nor has it proved any better (or worse) in 
furthering national social goals than the categorical grants 
it replaced. As a product of the new federalism thrust, CDBG 
has the endorsement of President Reagan. that its operations 
or effectiveness will be much different under the 
administration's expressed policy of hands-off than under 
earlier interventionist strategies is doubtful.
In "Major Themes and Additional Budget Details, Fiscal Year
1983," the Office of Management and Budget stated that the CDBG
program was "consistent with the administration’s concept of
federalism since it allows states and localities to determine
their own community and economic development needs and address
115them in a manner which best suits them. "
On October 2, 1984 Congress passed the Housing and Community
Development Technical Amendments Act of 1984. While containing a 
number of technical and conforming amendments to the block grant 
program, several substantive changes were made. The most
important of which was a clarification of the conditions under 
which a city or urban county, having few areas with a majority of
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low and moderate income residents, may have areawide community 
development activities qualifying as principally benefitting low 
and moderate income persons. If <in addition to the activity
being designed to the needs of low and moderate income residents) 
the area served by the activity ranks among the top 25 percent of 
all the areas within a community's jurisdiction, based on the 
highest concentration of low and moderate income residents, the 
activity will qualify as principally benefiting low and moderate 
income persons.
Mary Ann Steger of the University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee
argues the CDBG program is a major example of the "Mew Federalism"
117initiative that gave discretion to local jurisdictions. She
identifies two factors that influence the process: 1) The
decision-making rules and procedures and 2) the influence exerted
113by organized groups or powerful individuals.
A study, conducted by Steger, looked at Group influence on 
Decision-making in Milwaukee. She assumed that neighborhood
advisory councils would have different recommendations than a 
city-wide advisory committee because local councils focus on 
housing and community development needs of their neighborhood 
while the latter would focus on a community-wide program and 
generally support the local administering agency. Her study found 
that there was an almost perfect correlation (r=.99) between the 
City-wide Advisory Committee and the local agency and a moderate 
correlation (r=.39) between the neighborhood councils and the 
local agency. She also found that the local agency favored
35
physical over service programs and neighborhood councils favored
both physical and service programs.
Steger*s study also found that procedural rules had the
greatest impact on decision-making. While the actual structure
may be different in local jurisdictions, Community Development
Agencies act on proposals first, and then they are given to the
120advisory councils and committees to review.
Incremental ism is also another factor. Because many CDBG 
programs are multi-year capital-intensive projects, and local 
jurisdictions have the ability to implement these projects, very 
little change occurs in funding priorities. Likewise, local non­
profit agencies, who provide housing rehabilitation and public
121services, will continue to operate these programs.
The decision-making process will also be affected by the
Reagan Administrations’ goal to reduce or eliminate CDBG and to
122shift housing and community development programs to the states. 
Stegers’ study concludes that:
Once a CDBG program is established in a city and procedures 
are set, neighborhood concerns or the priorities of nonprofit 
neighborhood groups could be ignored unless the structure and 
procedures open the system to this kind of influence or unless 
these priorities have been incorporated into the rules.
Targeting, during the first ten years, weakened the CDBG
program. The 1980 census added new, less needy, entitlement
jurisdictions. Also, poorer communities received greater
reductions in CDBG funds because of increases to metropolitan
124areas and a decrease in the overall CDBG allocation.
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In 1985, the Reagan Administration proposed a 10 percent
reduction in the Community Development Block Grant Program for the
1986 fiscal year. The 1985 appropriation of $3,472 billion would
be reduced to $3.1248 in 1986. Reagan also proposed that the
current 70/30 split of the allocation between entitlement
communities and States, respectively, be changed to a 60/40 ratio,
with entitlement communities being reduced by 10 percent. The
Administration argued that the 10 percent increase or $203 million
in nonentitlement funds was justified because it would compensate
for the proposed reduction of $650 million to the Farmer’s Home
Administration's community and economic development assistance in
125rural areas of the nation.
In April, 1985 the Congressional Research Service (CRS) of 
The Library of Congress submitted an internal memo that provided a 
pro/con discussion for the termination of the Community 
Development Block Grant Program. The memo indicated that CRS 
would also provide a pro/con discussion for the termination of the 
General Revenue Sharing program at a later date <which, as we 
know, was terminated) . Arguments favoring termination of the CDBG 
program included the restrictive nature of the requirement that 51 
percent of local program funds be expended to the benefit of low- 
and-moderate income persons because it took away "local government 
autonomy in determining their housing, community development, and 
economic development needs and goals;" the methods used by States 
and local jurisdictions, in allocating funds, weakens the 
effectiveness of the program because it spreads expenditures over
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a wide variety of programs; and existing State housing, community
development, and economic development programs provide similar
benefits. The memo cited a 1984 U. S. Department of Treasury
report which projects "that the States will have budget surpluses
totaling, in the aggregate, close to $86 billion by 1989, while
the Federal government faces a budget deficit approaching $220
billion." In turn, arguments for the continuation of the program
included the positive aspect of the 51 percent requirement because
it targeted funds to persons in need; local control over programs
by allowing them to target funds based on the three broad national
objectives, making the program "less prescriptive than traditional
categorical programs and more focused in its objectives than the
GRS (General Revenue Service) program;" and the CDBG program has
been effective in rehabilitation of housing, creating jobs, and
126improving the "physical” environment.
Paul R. Dommel, of Cleveland State University and Michael J. 
Rich, of Brown University, using a composite urban conditions 
index developed by Brookings Institution, evaluated the 814 
entitlement jurisdictions receiving CDBG allocations in 1985 to 
compare relative needs. Their findings are summarized on TABLES 
ORE and TWO.127
Table 1
Distribution of Most and Least Distressed Jurisdictions
Urban Conditions Index 
1970 by
Population Size, Region, and Type of Jurisdiction
Urban Conditions Index - 1970
Most Distressed Least Distressed
N Number Percent Number Percent
POPULATION SIZE 1982
Greater than 1 Million 10 4 40. 0 2 20. 0
500,000 - 1 Million 39 6 15. 4 16 41. 0
250,000 - 499,999 80 10 12. 5 18 22. 5
100,000 - 249,999 160 21 13. 1 37 23. 1
50,000 - 99,999 273 49 17. 9 63 23. 1
25,000 - 49,999 171 52 30. 4 15 8.8
Less Than 25,000 43 13 30. 2 4 9.3
REGION
Northeast 170 71 41. 8 5 2.9
North Central 201 30 14. 9 38 18. 9
South 217 43 19. 8 46 21. 2
Vest 176 6 3.4 65 36. 9
Puerto Rico 12 5 41. 7 1 8. 3
TYPE OF JURISDICTION
Central Cities 501 142 28. 3 40 8. 0
Suburban Cities 168 11 6 . 5 73 43. 5
Urban Counties 107 2 1.9 42 39. 3
NOTE: NC1970) = 776 / Classification based on U.S.Bureau of Census
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Table 2
Distribution of Most and Least Distressed Jurisdictions
Urban Conditions Index 
1980 by
Population Size, Region, and Type of Jurisdiction
N
Urban Conditions Index - 1980 
Most Distressed Least Distressed 
Number Percent Number Percent
POPULATION SIZE - 1982
Greater than 1 Million 10 4 40. 0 1 10. 0
500,000 - 1 Million 39 7 17. 9 14 35. 9
250,000 - 499,999 81 13 16. 0 17 21. 0
100,000 - 249,999 163 28 17. 2 34 20.9
50,000 - 99,999 305 52 17. 0 77 25. 2
25,000 - 49,999 173 48 27. 7 17 9.8
Less Than 25,000 43 10 23. 3 3 7. 0
REGION
Northeast 197 89 45. 2 9 4.6
North Central 205 45 22. 0 31 15. 1
South 219 22 10. 0 49 22. 4
Vest 181 6 3.3 70 38. 7
Puerto Rico 12 0 0. 0 4 33. 3
TYPE OF JURISDICTION
Central Cities 504 141 28. 0 44 8.7
Suburban Cities 203 19 9. 4 85 41.9
Urban Counties 107 2 1.9 34 31. 8
NOTE: N <1980)= 814 / Classification based on U. S .Bureau of Census
The Dommel & Rich study concluded that entitlement 
jurisdictions, found to be most distressed, were the very large or 
very small communities. Also, the conditions in the most
distressed entitlement jurisdictions worsened, both in absolute
*| ooand relative terms, during the decade studied. In addition,
the data revealed that the CDBG program was becoming less
129responsive to the needs of entitlement communities.
Because of the two elements of the CDBG program allocation 
process: 1) eligibility and 2) formula, Dommel & Rich suggest
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reweighting formulas (which their study found had a small effect
on overall targeting); reducing the number of entitlement
communities; adjusting current allocations; and better targeting
by reweighting the current formulas and/or making adjustments in
130allocations by using other factors or index. Dommel & Rich
admit, in conclusion, that "The answer to the question, What can
be done? —  and thus the problem —  lies more in political will
131than in technically feasible solutions."
During 1986 Hearings, on the Reauthorization of the Community
Development Block Grant program, before the Subcommittee on
Housing and Community Development of the House of Representatives,
Chairman Henry B. Gonzalez identified a "clear-cut challenge" from
the Reagan Administration for elimination of the CDBG program. He
critized HUD for their failure to properly monitor local
132communities. Representative Gonzalez believes:
Congress can do substantially better than the President 
proposes. But we need to convince a number of other
members...that the President’s proposals must be rejected.
Appearing before the Subcommittee were Mayors representing
Omaha; Augusta, Maine; Charleston; and Cleveland. Mayor Harold
Washington of Chicago presented a detailed report of the successes
of the CDBG program in Chicago. Also over 30 others, from public
interest groups representing senior citizens, neighborhood
coalitions, and tenant organizations testified.
Mayor James E. Roark of Charleston, West Virginia summarized
the Reagan Administrations drive to reduce the CDGB program by
declaring that the National League of Cities "strongly opposes the
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proposed reductions in the CDBG program.” Mayor Roark reminded 
the committee that the 1986 appropriation was down by 10 percent 
<$3,125 billion), which was reduced an additional 4.3 percent by 
the Gramm-Rudman-Hoilings legislation; that Reagan attempted to 
defer $500 million in 1977, which would have resulted in an 
overall 30 percent reduction from 1985 funding levels; and his 
recommendation to change the current 70/30 split to a 65/35 
percent split for entitlement and nonentitlement jurisdictions, 
respectively, because of the termination of over $600 million in
Farm Home Administration* s rural community development
133programs.
Mayor George V. Voinovich of Cleveland took both a serious and
134humorous approach to the proposed reductions:
We have a Secretary of HUD that has yet to set foot in a 
public housing project anywhere in this country... The 
President wears $3,500 cowboy boots. His wife wears $28,500 
garments. I can’t expect them to feel that if you deprive a 
family living on the other side of the expressway of $75 a 
month in food stamps that they are going to suffer much.
In a subsequent Field Hearing held in Hazelton, Pa., an
September 8 , 1986, before the House of Representatives
Subcommittee on Housing and Community Development, thirteen
representatives from Pennsylvania housing and community
development organizations testified against reduction and
elimination of the CDGB program. Again, Chairman Gonzalez set the
tone for the hearing by offering that local communities struggle
to rebuild, expand business, and create jobs. Further, he
challenged the Reagan Administration’s recommendations to greatly
reduce the CDBG program while increasing foreign and defense
135budgets. Chairman Gonzalez challenged the Congress by stating:
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Regrettably, the Congress has sometimes gone along with these 
requests for deep cuts. I believe that this is a misguided 
policy. Community Development programs work and they save the 
Government money in the long run by reducing the costs of 
unemployment, insurance and other social services. Jobs 
should be our top priority, and history has proven that 
community development programs provide jobs.
In a prepared statement, Gary F. Lamont, representing Luzerne 
County's [Pennsylvania] Board of Commissioners and Office of
Community Development, summarized the overall feeling of those
136testifying before the Subcommittee:
As CDBG funds relate to the revitalization of older 
neighborhoods, the increased cost of home rehabilitation, 
along with necessary neighborhood infrastructure and amenities 
such as recreation areas, neighborhood centers, senior 
centers, etc., makes the ability to complete a substantial 
improvement prohibitive...While it is understood that 
balancing the budget is not an easy task, if the objective of 
the federal government is to utilize its resources in those 
areas of distress, in order that they may become economically 
self sufficient, Luzerne County can show, by its demonstrated 
track record that, in utilizing sufficient funds, with local 
discretion, to create programs that will reverse its 
distressed condition, that we can become more self sufficient, 
with less reliance on federal funds. It is important that 
Luzerne County be able to utilize such federal funding, in 
order to reduce development costs, in order that we may have a 
competitive edge against areas which are not distressed and 
are receiving the ground swell of investment which equates 
into job opportunities.
In 1986, Kenneth K. Wong of the University of Oregon and Paul
E. Peterson of the Brookings Institution conducted a longitudinal
study of the implementation of the CDBG program in Baltimore and
Milwaukee. They looked at the effect of "new federalism" on
grants-in-aid. Had the Reagan Administration been successful in
fully implementing their program, categorical grant programs would
137have been reduced from 79% in 1980 to 34% in 1986.
The Wong & Peterson study reached the conclusion that both
economic limitations and political leaders influence CDBG policy
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decisions —  the pluralistic approach has been the common 
133explanation. Developmental policies, that address economic
concerns, are of high priority to political leaders because of the
economic and political benefits. Redistributive policies,
directed to the low income, are seen to have a negative impact
139because they attract nonproductive resources. They concluded,
from the study, that CDBG priorities are shaped by economic
concerns. The 80's will continue to see an emphasis placed upon
developmental strategies with redistributive policies being given
even less consideration. Because of increasing local control,
Wong and Peterson argue that ”it is unlikely that urban leaders,
at least for some time, will be capable of addressing the needs of
their impoverished residents,
In 1986, entitlement cities entered "The Age of Uncertainty,"
for the Community Development Block Grant program. Entitlement
cities were advised that fiscal 1986 appropriations would be
reduced by twelve to seventeen percent based upon an anticipated
Balanced Budget Act —  upon passage of the Act, entitlement
communities saw reductions of approximately sixteen percent. The
reductions were further compounded by the Reagan Administrations’
deferral of approximately $500 million of a $3.2 billion
141appropriation for the Community Development Block Grant.
While the Reagan Administration eventually supported a
supplemental appropriations bill that included the deferred funds,
entitlement cities began to look at limited options for their 
142city’s poor. Assistant General Manager for Kansas City, Mo.,
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summed up the feelings of many entitlement cities; "This kind of 
roller coaster approach doesn’t give us the kind of budgetary 
stability we’d like to allocate to our resources."^04 Most 
cities have found it difficult to allocate limited general funds 
to programs funded with the Community Development Block Grant—  
delayed capital expenditures and reduced program levels will 
greatly restrict planning initiatives.144
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT BLOCK GRANT - 
THE IMPACT OF REAGANOMICS
Under the Reagan Administration, the CDBG program, unlike
housing subsidy programs, met Reagan’s ideal of consolidation and
return of local control over federal programs. Surprisingly, the
CDBG program served as a model for turning social welfare programs
145into block grants to state and local jurisdictions. Also, CDBG
has had strong support from political and economic development
officials, on the local level, because of local control over the
CDBG program and the opportunity for funds to be used for "general
community improvement," while still being primarily directed to
low-and-moderate-income persons.
However, the CDGB program did not escape the Reagan
Administration’s drive to reduce domestic expenditures. In 1981,
OMB Director David Stockman recommended dramatic reductions in the
CDBG program allocations. Because of intervention by HUD
Secretary Pierce, state, and local officials, the CDGB program was
147continued, but not at the same levels enjoyed in the 1970’s.
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The Reagan Administration had differing degrees of success in 
making changes to the CDBG program. First, the one having the 
greatest impact was turning the administration of small, non­
entitlement cities over to state government control. The fears of 
some community development officials that this action would cause 
the program to become less effective was born out by a HUD report 
that revealed, in most states, the number of jurisdictions 
increased an average of 75 percent; the average grant decreased 
approximately 50%, and a strong emphasis was placed on economic
development and public facility improvements over housing 
148programs. Secondly, the Department of Housing and Urban
Development proposed to lessen the requirement that the CDBG
program benefit primarily low-and-moderate-income persons. HUD,
wanting to interpret the CDBG program differently than the Carter
Administration, stated that the other two broad national
objectives of "elimination of slums and blight" and "meeting
urgent community needs. ..would be treated as coequal.M
However, in the 1983 CDBG reauthorization bill, Congress reached a
compromise with the Reagan Administration. The compromise would
provide for a requirement that 51 percent of the CDBG allocation
150had to be spent for low-and-moderate-income persons. And,
third, the Reagan Administration proposed the "enterprise zones" 
program which would allow cities to identify a certain area as 
"distressed." Relief would be granted from federal taxes and 
regulations to private businesses engaged in economic development.
The program also encouraged state and local governments to grant
. ,. - 151tax relief.
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The Reagan Administration’s goal was to <1> remove a federal
agency’s direct control over programs for the disadvantaged, and
(2> have local and state governments solve their own community
development problems. While the strong momentum, started in the
Nixon era, has been diminished, it is still strong enough to cause
serious concern for those who want federal housing and community
development programs. It will take strong lobbying to save
152federal programs aimed at the disadvantaged.
153R. Allen Hays argues that the CDBG program was:
developed and pushed through by a moderately conservative 
administration...[representing] a long-term disengagement of 
the federal government from urban problems, particularly from 
the problems of those distressed cities which had competed 
most vigorously for categorical community development funds.
The more modest kinds of housing and neighborhood upgrading 
typical of CDBG programs reflect this underlying spirit of 
disengagement...CDBG has been in harmony with the lowered 
voices and lowered expectations which Richard Nixon envisioned 
for the 1970’s, yet it is far from the total retrenchment 
liberals feared and some conservatives wanted. , .and how the 
Reagan Administration has tried to turn this modest
disengagement into a rapid federal withdrawal from community 
development and other urban problems.
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT BLOCK GRANT - 
REHABILITATION AS AN U. S. HOUSING POLICY
Rehabilitation, as an United States housing policy, has, at
most, been an afterthought as a strategy to improve the nation’s
housing stock. While FHA’s mortgage insurance program provided
financing for rehabilitation, very few took advantage of the
program. The Housing Act of 1954 authorized rehabilitation as a
part of urban renewal, but the strategy was to clear and rebuild
154the inner cities.
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The post-World War II strategy was ’’new —  new factories, new
commercial developments, and new housing in the suburbs reached by
155new cars on newly built freeways.” Progress has been measured
by how fast suburban areas have been able to provide ’’bedroom 
communities” to wealthier middle class families. Cities began 
trying to compete with large malls, modern office buildings, and 
shifting industrial bases by mass clearance and rebuilding
projects and converting closed factories and warehouses into
156office space and restaurants.
There have been both economic and administrative reasons for
negative reactions to rehabilitation. Besides being a slow
157process some of the other reasons are:
<1) mass production has proven very difficult to utilize in 
rehabilitation;
(2) housing rehabilitation requires a very different set of 
relationships between government agencies and citizens than 
does suburban new construction or clearance of older areas;
<3) rehabilitation of existing structures in older, declining 
areas is.,.a risky venture...unless the area in which the 
structure is located is substantially upgraded, owners often 
have difficulty attracting tenants at rents which will support 
even subsidized borrowing for rehabilitation. And,
(4) rehabilitation of structures which remain in private hands 
has met resistance on dual grounds <a) that forced inspection 
and rehabilitation violates the property rights of landlords 
and homeowners; and Cb) that direct subsidies to private 
owners which enhance the value of an asset they hold represent 
an unfair benefit to a few owners at the expense of others.
While none of the problems with rehabilitation were solved,
it became a popular strategy in community development during the
1970’s. Those who had moved to the suburbs found that crime,
higher costs of living and social conscience gave way to a ’’back
to the city movement.” ’’Pioneering” and ’’homesteading” became
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popular terms. However, through restoring of older inner city 
neighborhoods, many of them historical, caused property values to 
increase and low-income persons were forced out —  gentrification 
became the new ’’buzz” word for the 70’s and 80’s. 158
Urban policy researchers began looking at the dynamics of 
gentrif icat ion. Franklin J. James found ’’that the middle 70's saw 
a modest increase in the proportion of central city dwellers
owning their own homes and a proportionally faster increase in the
RQvalue of central city housing than in suburban housing,”
However, more careful studies found that what was thought to
be a mass exodus of suburbanites to the inner cities was, in
reality, only a ’’trickle.” Demographics revealed that very few
families and neighborhoods were involved in rehabilitation
efforts. Counteracting the movement back to the cities was the
fact that middle class white families were moving out of cities
and into the suburbs.
Additional studies found that young singles and newly married
couples were the ones being attracted to the inner cities because
of lower incomes and families. Also, lower income homeowners were
rehabilitating their homes rather than attempting an unaffordable 
161move.
While the numbers were not large, reversal of a trend to move
out of the inner cities, and the psychological impact, created
enough impetus to cause a change in the urban housing policy by
162focusing on housing rehabilitation.
When the CDBG Program was approved in 1974, rehabilitation 
was allowed only as a supplemental program to other CDBG
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activities. However, in 1977, HUD and local political officials
convinced Congress to drop any limitation on rehabilitation for
~ , 163four primary reasons:
(1) Cities traditionally active in urban renewal were generally 
receiving less money than before, and therefore, could not 
afford the massive investment in acquisition, relocation, and 
demolition required by further clearance projects;
(2) Housing rehabilitation fit the need of localities to spread 
out the dollars among a larger number of claimants. Whereas 
clearance lent itself to concentrated efforts in the worst
neighborhoods, rehabilitation lent itself to more modest efforts 
in several, less deteriorated neighborhoods. The fact that
numerous, well organized neighborhood groups existed in many 
localities also enhanced the normal desire of local political 
leaders to please as many citizens as possible with a given 
expenditure of funds;
(3) housing rehabilitation...was less disruptive for existing 
neighborhoods and settlement patterns; and
(4) A compatibility between housing rehabilitation and the 
generally lowered expectations about federal involvement in 
urban problems which characterized the 1970’s.
While the CDBG program can be seen as a greater pro-housing 
strategy, there are some aspects that create concern. CDBG 
efforts seem to bypass severe slum areas and their low income 
inhabitants; rehabilitation is a slow process because of 
administrative procedures, limited funds, and the fact that there 
have not been a massive number of upgraded units; and 
rehabilitation has to compete with other local community 
development needs, public works and facilities, and economic 
development.164
Sarah F. Liebschutz of the State University of New York, 
Brockport conducted a study of CDBG funded neighborhood 
conservation projects and the political choices local officials 
have to make in responding to the needs of their local
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neighborhoods. She notes that community development and 
neighborhood conservation have become synonymous. While the old 
urban renewal programs were widely critized, the CDBG program has
continued to be renewed with a strong emphasis on neighborhood
. . 165improvement.
Liebschutz identifies two factors that complicate allocation 
of CDBG funds to targeted neighborhoods because of the competition 
of limited resources.* ” 1) The relationship between neighborhood 
change and public sector intervention is not well understood, and
2) although the CDBG legislation assigns primary responsibility to 
local elected officials to determine community development 
priorities and programs, it also specifies that low and moderate 
income persons are to be the primary beneficiaries.
According to Suzanne Keller, in her book "The Urban
Neighborhood: A Sociological Perspective,” published in 1968,
167Urban Neighborhoods:
gain their distinctiveness from one or more of these sources: 
ethnic or cultural traits of inhabitants; geographical/spatial 
boundaries; psychological unity; and concentrated use of an 
area's facilities for commerce, education and leisure.
In 1979, Roger S. Ahlbrandt, Jr. and James V. Cunningham, 
coauthored two studies in which they found neighborhoods to be 
dynamic, regardless of their main characteristic or function. A 
neighborhood is:
ever changing in small ways, sometimes in large ways. A 
neighborhood never stands still. It improves or declines or 
does some of both at the same time. If a neighborhood’s 
improvement keeps pace with its decline, its population 
changes slowly, and newcomers generally hold to the same 
values and lifestyles as long-time residents, then we say it 
is stable. [Neighborhood change is] the interactive and 
cumulative effects of a number of different parties and 
circumstances which create the environment conducive to 
neighborhood decline.
51
Liebschutz argues that "conversely, if decline outpaces 
improvement, population turnover is rapid, and if the value of 
newcomers contrast significantly with those of long-term 
residents, the neighborhood is characterized by instability and 
decline. An improving or rising neighborhood is one which shares 
the latter two characteristics of the declining neighborhood, but 
experiences reinvestment or gentrification. "
Because of a lack of understanding of the dynamics of 
neighborhood change and the effects of public intervention on 
urban neighborhoods, unintended effects have taken place. In 
1980, Rolf Goetz, writing on the monitoring of neighborhood change
for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, found
, 170that:
Public intervention has been generally assumed to be 
beneficial when it is sometimes actually destabilizing, For 
example, it has been assumed that low down-payment mortgages 
insured by the Federal Housing Administration <FHA) are 
beneficial, but in some cities "FHA only" has come to mean 
that only government insured mortgages are available and only 
low down-payment buyers are buying. This can stigmatize a 
physically sound neighborhood with an image of a changing 
neighborhood, mortgage foreclosures and abandoned houses. 
Consequently, market demand evaporates as the areas are 
shunned and widespread, self-fulfilling disinvestment can set 
in.
While the debate continues as to the causes of neighborhood
change, and what it will take to reverse negative impact,
Liebschutz identifies several factors that create appeal for
171politicians to support neighborhood-based projects:
1) Allocations of block grants for such projects clearly
indicate the responsiveness of mayors and city council members 
to pressures from neighborhood groups for home improvement 
loans, code enforcement activities, beautification projects, 
street improvements, and the like.
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2) Because such projects are short-term, and can be 
implemented within a year or two, they are reasonable 
candidates for inclusion in the annual funding application to 
HUD.
3) The short-term nature and the visibility of such projects 
make them particularly attractive both to neighborhood groups 
and to local politicians who must run for reelection.
4) Neighborhood-based projects have appeal because of their 
potential for extending the value of the investment of public 
f unds.
5) Through involvement of neighborhood residents in planning 
and implementing neighborhood revitalization, the local
government comes to be viewed as a partner, not an adversary. 
Private initiative to supplement the block grant is thereby 
facilitated.
John McClaughry, in his book "Neighborhood Revitalization,"
observes "Despite the problems of older cities, there is
considerable evidence that neighborhood residents can achieve
remarkable successes through creative self-help. Indeed, this
fact is of central importance to the encouragement of an urban
172renaissance in the 1980s."
In concluding observations on the impact of revitalization
173efforts, since passage of the CDBG program, Liebschutz argues:
Policy analysts and politicians have invested a great deal in 
learning about and implementing neighborhood conservation 
strategies since the advent of CDBG. Yet the complex 
relationship between neighborhood change and public sector 
intervention still remains unclear. Part of the complexity 
derives from the dynamics of neighborhood change within the 
single city, and part from forces beyond the boundaries and 
beyond the control of a single city. Resources available for 
neighborhood conservation within a central city may simply be 
insufficient to overcome the lure of the surrounding suburbs. 
The dynamics of inter-regional economic competition may also 
override neighborhood conservation efforts by individual 
cities within the competing regions. Neighborhood
conservation, in sum, may have became synonymous with 
community development in American Cities. Whether it succeeds 
in revitalizing selected neighborhoods within individual 
cities, however, may be as must a result of political and 
economic factors beyond the sphere of influence of those 
cities as those factors within their control.
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COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT BLOCK GRANT - 
BUDGET AND APPROPRIATIONS
The national budget for the block grant program, between 1975 
and 1980, averaged a 9.1 percent increase; between 1981 and 1986 
the program received an average decrease of 7 percent. Overall, 
between 1975 and 1986, the budget increased an average of 8.6 
percent, both on the national level and for the State of Michigan. 
However, for the City of Flint, Michigan, the budget decreased 53 
percent. <See Table 3)17^
The level of annual CDBG appropriations were influenced by 
the Administration, Congress, special interest groups, and local 
and state officials. Another major factor was the adoption of the 
Gramm-Rudmann-Hol1ings legislation that forced the Administration 
and Congress to adopt Federal budgets reflecting decreases in the 
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In the following tables, TABLE 4 presents information on 
Administrative requests and Actual Appropriations for the CDBG 
program from Fiscal Year 1975 through 1989; TABLE 5 supplies 
information on budget authority for the period 1980 through 1989; 
and TABLE 6 furnishes information on the Budget Outlays for the 
CDBG program. <TABLE 5 & 6 takes into consideration the GNP
deflator and current and constant dollars):
TABLE 417°
BUDGET REQUEST AHD ACTUAL APPRQPRI AT I PITS FOR 
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT BLOCK GRANT (in millions)
FISCAL YEAR ADMIHISTRATIOH REQUEST APPROPRIATION
75 2,3001 2,432^ 
2,802“76 2, 500
77 3, 248 3,248;
78 3,500 3,6oo;
79 3, 750 3,750;
80 3, 900 3, 752
81 3, 950 3, 695
82 3, 960 3,456
83 3, 456 4, 456
84 3, 500 3, 468
85 3, 468 3, 472
86 3, 125 2, 990
87 2, 625 3, 000
88 2, 625 2, 880
89 2, 625 3, 000
1 - reflects the Nixon Administration request for funding of the 
community development special revenue sharing program proposed under 
the Better Communities Act.
2 - Included Financial Settlement Fund used to assist communities 
close out projects funded under the consolidated categorical programs 
that were repealed with the passage of the CDBG legislation. 
Activities under these programs became eligible for CDBG funding.
3 - Includes SI billion for an emergency jobs act, P. L. 95-8, in 




CDBG BUDGET AUTHORITY IN 
CONSTANT DOLLARS FOR THE
CURRENT 
FISCAL YEARS
1980 TO 1989 (In Millions) 
In 1980 Dollars
80 100. 0 $ 3,752.0 $ 3,752.0
81 109. 0 3,695.0 3,362.1
82 118. 1 3,456.0 2,926.3
83 123. 0 4,456.0 3,622.8
84 127. 8 3,468.0 2,713.6
85 132. 1 3,472.0 2,628.3
86 136, 0 2,990.0 2,198.3
87 139. 3 3,000.0 2,153.6
88 144, 7 2,880.0 1, 990. 3
89 148. 8 3.000.0 2, 016. 1
TABLE 6
CDGB BUDGET OUTLAYS IE CURRENT AHD 
CONSTANT DOLLARS FOR THE FISCAL YEARS 
X980 TO 1989 (in millions)
(in 1980 dollars)
Fiscal Year GUP Deflator Current Dollars Constant Dollars
80 100. 0 $ 3,902.0 $ 3,902.0
81 109. 9 4,042.0 3,677.9
82 118. 1 3,792.0 3,201.8
83 123. 0 3,554.0 3,889.4
84 127. 8 3,819.0 2,988.2
85 132. 1 3,817.0 2,889.5
86 136. 0 3,575.0* 2,628.7
87 139. 3 3,099.0* 2,224.7
88 144. 7 2,980.0 2,059.4
39 148, 8 2,959.0 1,988.6
* Estimates 
Document
contained in the President’s Fiscal Year 1987 Budge
Current dollar figures reflect actual budget authority and outlays 
for each of the programs* Budget authority and outlays expressed in 
current dollars do not reflect the impact that inflation or deflation 
might have on the purchasing power of the dollar relative to a fixed 
point in time or base year. In converting current dollars to
constant dollars a GNP deflator is used, with the deflator for the 
base year 1980 equal to 100 percent of the constant dollar value. 
The deflators for subsequent years are used to calculate the worth of 
each year* s budget authority and outlays relative to the base year. 
In order to convert budget authority and outlays expressed in current 
dollars to constant dollars the current dollar amount for each year 
is divided by the corresponding GNP deflator.
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COJOCUITITY DEVELOPMENT BLOCK GRAMT - AS OVERVIEW
The CDBG program was first authorized under Title I of the 
Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, as amended, P.L. 
93-383. The program replaced seven categorical programs
previously administered by the Department of Housing and Urban
Development, including urban renewal, model cities, and community 
facilities grants. The consolidation of activities previously 
funded by categorical grants into a block grant format provides 
communities with greater flexibility in addressing their community 
development needs, provides greater opportunity for long range 
planning at the local level, and cuts down Federal red tape and 
duplication of efforts.
Programs, currently authorized under Title I of the Housing
and Community Development Act of 1974, as amended, includes:
Entitlement grants; Small Cities program CHUD administered CDBG
nonentitlement funds); State’s program (State-administered CDBG 
nonentitlement funds); Secretary’s Fund program; Urban Development 
Action Grant program; and Loan Guarantees.
CDBG’s are awarded annually, on an entitlement basis, to
central cities of metropolitan areas, to cities with populations 
of 50,000 or more, to urban counties, and to states for 
distribution to nonurban counties and communities with populations 
of less than 50,000. Seventy percent of the appropriation is 
allocated to entitlement cities and thirty percent goes to states 
for distribution to nonentitlement communities. Funds are
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allocated according to one of two distribution formulas, whichever
1 7 9provides the greater amount of funding.
The factors involved in the first formula are population,
extent of poverty and extent of overcrowding, weighted 0.25,
0.50, and 0.50, respectively. No matching requirement. The
factors involved in the second formula are growth lag,
poverty, and age of housing, weighted a,20, 0.30, and o.50,
respectively.
Since 1985, there have been 810 entitlement communities 
eligible to receive CDBG funds. Local communities, administering 
the CDBG Program, may undertake a variety of activities intended 
to promote neighborhood revitalization and community and economic 
development. These include the acquisition and disposition of
real property, housing rehabilitation, historic preservation, 
energy conservation, public works construction and repairs, the 
construction of community facilities (except those used for the 
general conduct of local government), public services, assistance 
to community based groups, open space acquisition, economic 
development, code enforcement, cost associated with relocation of 
individuals and businesses, the removal of architectural barriers 
to the elderly and the handicapped, planning and urban design, and 
administrative costs. Funds may also be used to meet the non- 
Federal share requirements of other Federal programs.
Title I of the 1974 Act requires a community to submit an 
annual "Statement of Activities,” outlining projects it proposes 
to undertake during their program year, to the Department of
Housing and Urban Development. A proposed project can be
undertaken only if it addresses at least one of the three broad
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national objectives. The activity must: 1) primarily benefit low-
and-moderate income persons, defined as those with incomes, at, or 
less than, eighty percent of the median income of the jurisdiction
2) aid in the elimination of slums or blight, or 3) meet an urgent 
community development need that poses a threat to the health and 
safety of the community. States and entitlement cities are 
required to allocate at least sixty percent (P.L. 100-242, Housing 
and Community Development Act of 1987, increased the required 
allocation from 51 to 60 percent) of their funds to activities to 
primarily benefit low-and-moderate-income persons.
Section 104(a)(2) of the Act requires entitlement communities 
to furnish interested citizens and organizations with information 
on the amount of funds available for community development 
activities, the range of activities that may be undertaken, and 
information on how the community plans to minimize the 
displacement of proposed activities on low-and-moderate income 
persons. In addition, communities are required to provide
citizens with an opportunity to review and comment on the proposed 
’’Statement.” They must hold at least one public hearing in order 
to obtain the views of citizens regarding community development 
and housing needs. Also, the Act requires a community to consider 
the views and comments it receives from the public, and to modify 
its final ’’Statement of Activities,” before submitting it to the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development, if the community 
decides to amend the application. The Act also requires that the 
community make a copy of the final ’’Statement” available to 
citizens, if requested.
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Section 104(d) of the Act requires each community to include, 
as a part of its evaluation and performance report, summaries of 
comments it has received from citizens and organizations regarding 
its community development program. The report describes the 
progress the community has made in addressing the community 
development and housing needs identified in its previous years’ 
’’Statement of Activities,” to the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development.
In 1988, the Department of Housing and Urban Development
finally issued regulations, five years after Congress enacted
1 Pi nlegislative amendments (P.L. 98-181), to the CDBG program. The
main reason for the delay was to allow the Department of Justice,
which was assigned the responsibility to review and coordinate all
enforcement of civil rights and nondiscrimination regulations, by
Executive Order 12250, to conduct the review. It took the Justice
180Department four years to complete the evaluation.
The Department of Justice, as a result of their analysis,
brought the civil rights requirements closer to the Reagan
Administration’s philosophy. The preamble to the regulations
reads, ’’These revisions reflect interpretations of the holdings in
181recent Supreme Court decisions...”
HUD plans to also issue regulations based upon 1987
legislative amendments, not requiring interpretation, and the 1988
182Fair Housing Act (P.L. 100-430) Amendments.
The new CDBG regulations contain provisions to include any 
activity ’’assisted” by CDBG funds even if it does not involve an
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outlay of funds <ie. if a guarantee of a private-market loan is 
backed with CDBG funds); clarification of when CDBG funds can 
support a public service to churches or church owned facilities; 
defined conditions for aid to for-profit businesses; changes in 
eligible activities to include assistance for manufactured homes 
when it is a part of a communities housing stock, funds to build 
temporary shelters for persons with special needs, and disallowed 
historical rehabilitation when used for buildings where the
general conduct of business is carried out; refined the definition
of when a communities activities meet one of the three broad 
national objectives; and refined requirements for performance
'i o oreviews and program amendments,
HUD did not pursue its proposal to ”tighten up” the CDBG
regulations on its definition of administrative costs. HUD had
proposed "to expand the definition of administrative costs subject
to the 20 percent limit Con administrative costs] to include the
costs of any staff principally engaged in managing or supervising
other staff, even if they are primarily engaged in service
delivery functions.” —  HUD backed off when CDBG funded
communities took an allout assault on the proposal.
The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, as amended
also requires all communities, receiving CDBG funds, to provide
assurances, with their applications, that they will comply with
185the following related legislation:
1) Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 164; 2) Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1968; 3) Executive Order 11063 as amended by
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Executive Order 12259; 4) Section 109 of the Act; 5) Age
Discrimination Act of 1975; 6) Rehabilitation Act of 1973; 7) 
Labor Standards: Davis-Bacon; Contract Work Hours and Safety
Standards Act; 8) Section 104(f) of the National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969; 9) Section 202(a) of the Flood Disaster 
Protection Act of 1973; 10) Section 210 of the Uniform Relocation 
Assistance and real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970;
11) Executive Order 11246; 12) Section 3 of the Housing and Urban
Development Act of 1968; 13) Section 302 and 401(b) of the Lead-
Based Paint Poisoning Prevention Act; 14) 24 CFR Part 24: Use of
disbarred, suspended or ineligible contractors or subcontractors; 
15) 0MB Circular Nos. A-102, Revised A-110, A-87, and A-122: 
Uniform administrative requirements and cost principles; and 16) 
Attachment 0 of 0MB Circulars A-102 and A-110: Conflict of
Interest.
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IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT BLOCK GRANT:
CITY OF FLINT - AN ENTITLEMENT CITY
The City of Flint began receiving its CDBG Entitlement Grant
after approval of the Federal Budget in October 1974. The
Department of Community Development is the designated city
department authorized to administer the grant, under direction of
the Mayor with approval of the Flint City Council. Since 1974,
the City of Flint has received a total formula entitlement grant
of Seventy nine million four hundred eighty-three thousand dollars
C$79,483,000). Of the total entitlement, Sixteen million two
thousand and twenty-nine dollars ($16,002,029), has been allocated
1for local Administration of the program.
During the first two years of the CDBG program, the City of 
Flint allocated most of the entitlement grant for Urban Renewal 
Completion, phase out of model cities programs, property 
acquisition, relocation, and demolition.
The City of Flint had cut back on its Urban Renewal Projects, 
a few years earlier, because the number of projects, originally 
undertaken, created an administrative burden on the City. As a 
result, the St. John and Oak Park Urban Renewal Projects were the 
only two Categorical Programs remaining upon implementation of the 
Community Development Block Grant program. An allocation for
continuation of Model Cities programs was phased out in the first 
entitlement year and urban renewal completion phased out in the 
fourth entitlement year (1978).
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The City of Flint was ordered, under a class action suit, to 
complete the Oak Park Urban Renewal Project. The City had every 
intention of completing the project, but upon the action, brought 
by a Flint City Councilman, the Court issued a specific order 
requiring that twenty-five percent <25%) of each annual CDBG 
allocation be spent to complete the project, with a complicated 
three tiered ’’buy out” schedule. The order greatly reduced the 
city’s block by block, organized methodology. The City had to 
begin spot buying of property, leaving scattered, occupied 
structures to be purchased —  fifteen years after the
implementation of the CDBG program.
Between 1974 and 1989, Flint allocated a total of $12,280,982 
for property acquisition; $1,850,874 for clearance & demolition; 
$8,214,753 to relocate persons displaced by Community Development 
projects; $1,204,090 for maintaining the vacant land acquired 
under CDBG (weed/trash abatement); $2,200,000 for River Front 
Center; $77,000 in Buick City Acquisition; $200,771 for private- 
owned utilities; $212,970 for St. John Office Park Project Utility 
relocation and redevelopment; $549,523 for City-wide scattered
site demolition; and $8,230,613 for Public Services that have 
included small and minority business services, cultural 
enrichment, services for the elderly, Foot Patrol, recycling
material pickup, Hispanic language services, neighborhood
convention, Fair Housing Opportunity programs, Emergency Shelter 
for Women, Federation of the Blind, Urban Coalition/Flint,
Leadership Flint, Urban Girl Scouting, Flint/Genesee County
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Childcare, Salem Housing Task Force, Vista Coordinator, Children’s
Museum, Transition House, Kennedy Center, Teen Crime Prevention,
1 ̂ 7Stewart Community Council, and Crime Watch programs.
The largest allocation of the Flint CDBG program has gone to 
Housing Rehabilitation and related activities. During the first 
two years of the CDBG Program, the Department of Community 
Development had a small, in-house rehabilitation program, 
allocating a total of $381,387. However, since 1977, when the 
Flint Neighborhood Improvement and Preservation Project, Inc. 
(FLINT NIPP) was created, the City has allocated $25,388,938 for 
housing rehabilitation; $1,135,518 for interim assistance;
$3,545,517 for Flint NIPP housing services (an administrative 
cost); $140,104 for Rodent Control; and $10,000 for a lead base 
paint program. This represents a total CDBG allocation of 38% or 
$30,220,077 to Flint NIPP between 1977 and 1988.
The City of Flint’s Department of Community Development has 
allocated its CDBG Program funds, from 1975 to 1988, as shown in 
TABLE A-l through TABLE A-4.
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TABLE A—1 
CITY OF FLINT 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMONITY DEVELOPMENT 
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT BLOCK GRANT ALLOCATIONS
1975 - 1978
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SUB-TOTAL: -o- 287,539 642,167 1,116,685
GRAND TOTAL: 7,737,000 8,090,817 7, 608,000 6,640,032
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TABLE A—2 
CITY OF FLINT 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT BLOCK GRANT ALLOCATIONS1979 - 1982































































SUB-TOTAL: 6, 963,589 5,539,878 4,953,409 5,062,323
PUBLIC SERVICES:
Small Bus.Serv. 























SUB-TOTAL: 924,411 1,153,989 1,106,724 317,494
GRAND TOTAL: 7,888,000 6,693,867 6,060,133 5,379,817
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TABLE A—3 
CITY OF FLINT 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT BLOCK GRANT ALLOCATIONS
1983 - 1985
1983 1984 1985
Entitlement Grant 5,045,000 4,707,000 4,797,000
Adj ustments <244,091) 326,250 <734,305)
Program Income 449,000 451,660 783,495
TOTALS: 5,249,909 5,484,910 4,846,190
CDBG ACTIVITIES:
Prop.Acquisition 550,703 678,748 240,900
Clearance/demo 38,599 215,449 74,152
Hous i ng Re hab. 2,491,934 2,176,901 2,423,844
Land Maint/Disp. 100,000 129,408 40,772
Relocation Paymts 317,526 393,903 379,203
Pub. Improvements 25,000
Gen.Admn/Prog.Dev. 1,045,903 992,969 1,082,985
Interim Assist. 105,775 106,782 88,683
Priv.Owned Util. 200,771
Economic Dev. 368,058 250,000
St.John Util. 9, 874
SUB-TOTAL: 4,876,211 5,062,218 4,590,413
PUBLIC SERVICES:
Small Bus.Serv 94,728
Serv. for Elderly 215,000 209,066 194,655
Rodent Control 44,254 26,500
Hispanic Lang.Serv 15,957
Neighborhood Conv. 3, 032 15,329
Fair Hsing.Prog. 9, 954
Emerg. Shelter/Women 15,000
Fed. of Blind 8, 000
Urban Coal/Flint 3, 750
Leadership Flint 2, 000
Urban Girl Scouts 2, 000
Kennedy Center 45,000
SUB-TOTAL: 373,698 285,352 261,859
GRAND TOTAL: 5,249,909 5,347,570 4,852,272
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TABLE A—4 
CITY OF FLINT 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMONITY DEVELOPMENT 
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT BLOCK GRANT ALLOCATIONS
1986 - 1988
1986 1987 1988
Entitlement Grant 4,173,000 4,169,000 3,978,000
Adj ustments 810,820
Program Income 611,440 580,548 1,150,000
TOTALS: 5,595,260 4,769,348 5,128,000
CDBG ACTIVITIES:
Prop.Acquisition 746,596 572,203 415,155
Clearance/Demo 206,830 108,945 114,883
Housing Rehab. 1,499,000 1,398,053 1,748,265
Land Maint/Dispo. 95,000 90,000 90,000
Relocation Paymts 366,230 380,297 265,562
Gen.Admn/Prog. Dev 960,545 1,042,399 995,600
Interim Assist. 86,000 100,000 75,000
Economic Dev. 691,212 405,000 460,604
St.John Util. 203,096
CityWide Demo 119,327 85,000 345,196
Pilot Hsing Proj . 201,600
SUB-TOTAL: 5,175,436 4,181,897 4,510,265
PUBLIC SERVICES:
Serv. for Elderly 228,138 230,000 210,000
FNIPP Hsing Serv. 200,000 250,000 276,735
Rodent Control 15,000 15,000 15,000
Fair Hsing Prog. 9, 994 20,000
Emerg. Shelter/Women 15,000 18,000 25,000
Fed. of Blind 16,000 10,000
Urban Girl Scouts 4, 200
Flint/Gen.Childcare 15,600 15,000 7, 000
Salem Hsg.Task Force 10,500 29,652 60,000
Vista Coordinator 7, 713 4, 000
Fit.Children Museum 10,000 3, 000
Transition House 18,800
Teen Crime Prev. 1, 962
Stewart Schl.Council 7, 000
Crime Watch 2, 401
Lead base Paint Prog. 10,000
SUB-TOTAL: 555,308 587,652 617,735
GRAND TOTAL: 5,730,744 4,769,549 5,128,000
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CITY OF FLINT 
IMPLEMENTATION OF A HOUSING REHABILITATION PROJECT 
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT BLOCK GRANT PROGRAM
Flint NIPP is a non-profit 501<c)<3) organization developed 
from a recommendation made by a Mayoral Task Force on Neighborhood 
Revitalization, appointed by Mayor James W. Rutherford, in 1976. 
The Task Force was implemented based upon concerns of the City’s 
black Community. In October 1976, the Task Force recommended a 
non-profit organization be developed, with a board of directors, 
to ”oversee the task of citywide housing rehabilitation,” and to 
"see to the initiation of a continuing public relations effort 
including neighborhood community organization programs.” The City 
of Flint completed the necessary requirements to form the non­
profit housing agency, and then turned operation over to its board
, ,, . 188 of directors.
The City of Flint has maintained a close relationship with 
Flint NIPP because of the Community Development Block Grant 
Regulations requirement to monitor an agencies activities and the 
fact that the City of Flint is the actual recipient of the CDBG 
funds, and therefore, ultimately responsible to the Federal 
Government. Because of the close relationship between the City 
and Flint NIPP, clients have turned to the City’s Department of
Community Development Staff, and the Ombudsman Office, to
intervene in matters which should appropriately be handled by
internal grievance procedures established at Flint NIPP.
The rehabilitation program and services provided by Flint 
NIPP, and the problems associated with such a program, are no 
different than those created by many other local communities under
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the CDBG Program — except that Flint NIPP has been the model used 
to develop similar programs in other communities. But this does 
not mean that Flint NIPP has not had its share of criticisms 
during its thirteen year history of providing rehabilitation and 
neighborhood programs to low-and-moderate-income persons in 
various Census Tracts located in the City of Flint. Many of the 
criticisms are duplicates of those expressed during Congressional 
Hearings and the findings of scholars conducting research on the 
CDBG Program.
In its sixth year of operation, 1984, Flint NIPP had become a 
national model for its successes, but had come under heavy local 
criticism. As a result, the Mott Foundation provided a $10,000 
Grant to Flint NIPP for the purpose of hiring a consultant to 
conduct an evaluation of the Corporation. The Pratt Institute 
Center for Community and Environmental Development, from New York, 
was awarded a contract in February 1984 to conduct the evaluation.
Pratt was to review overall programming, procedures, 
policies, program guidelines, operation of the rehabilitation 
program, and recommend new programs as appropriate.
After coming to the community twice, three days in February
and three days in April 1984, they prepared an evaluation and
190recommendations for improving what was "wrong at FNIPP.”
The Pratt "Methodology” included interviews with the Flint 
NIPP Director, Board President, three board members, city and NIPP 
staff, two clients having active complaints, Mayor, a City 
Councilperson, Ombudsman, four Flint NIPP contractors, two of 
which were minorities, members of the Civic Park Historical
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Community League, that had recently critized Flint NIPP, and six
persons on the street. In addition, Pratt representatives
randomly selected fifteen structures that had been rehabilitated
and conducted interviews with eight of the homeowners. From this
relatively sparse sampling, Pratt set out to discover all that was
191"wrong at FNIPP.” Pratt tempered their findings by pointing
out that their study was occurring at a particularly critical time
in Flint NIPP’s history and they were not hired to point out the
192positives, but the negatives.
Pratt, overall, found Flint NIPP "an impressive organization
with an impressive array of programs and services...[and] judged
FNIPP to have used the past six years to construct an organization
that has accomplished far more during its short history than most
193comparable organizations.”
However, with that overview of Flint NIPP, Pratt proceeded to
list a number of problem areas and recommendations for
improvement:
BOARD OF DIRECTORS:
The study found that the Flint NIPP Board of Directors
provided very little input into policy and goal development. The
City’s Department of Community Development, through its Director
Jack Litzenberg and Flint NIPP’s first Director A. Robert Kucab,
194had been the primary innovators. Pratt found Board actions to
be a ’’mere f orraality. ”
The study also cited the Board for its lack of participation 
in the monitoring of consumer complaints. An arbitration panel
had been establish to handle such matters. In fact, Pratt found
that there had. been at least two complaints that had. not been
resolved in three years, even though they had been reported to the
Board, the City of Flint, the Ombudsman, and had been reported in
the local Flint Journal —  the Board was surprise at the degree of
hostility expressed by complainants and several members were not
196even aware of the Corporate policy on resolving complaints.
Pratt recommended that the Board establish a grievance 
committee, which the Board did at its meeting of April 27, 1984,
1 Q 7but before the final Pratt report.
Pratt also criticized the Board because ’'the board seems to
lack an independent conception of the capability of FNIPP or a
vision for the city separate from that of the CD Dept. Hence its
expectation of the staff are exceptionally modest and follow the
goals set by the city in its CD contract, which are not, in the
first instance, very demanding (though this may be because of a
19Slack of resources available to FNIPP and the City of Flint)."
Pratt concluded that the Board should review the White Paper,
issued by the Task Force that recommended its creation, to gain
guidance into its posture of independence, Flint NIPP was to have
been an independent corporation that would "eliminate the stigma
199of government-controlled programs."
Within the context of accountability, Pratt observed that,
while the Board was racially and ethnically balanced, it needed to
have a more "representativeness” when it came to citizen 
200access. Based upon this recommendation, Flint NIPP expanded
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its Board of Directors to include ”neighborhood representatives**
from those target areas receiving CDBG assistance.
In concluding its review of the Board, Pratt found that,
given Flint NIPP’s authority as **a sole-source contractor in
housing for the City of Flint,** Flint NIPP should ’’become more
aggressively responsive to other public needs. The primary one we
think can be addressed— given FNIPP*s mission— is providing
201construction trade training and jobs for minority youth.” This
Pratt recommendation had little merit. First, because Flint
NIPP’s mission does not include job training, and secondly,
considering the number of skilled tradesmen out of work, in 1984
as well as in 1989, any skills learned, would have little value in
202a competitive market place.
FLINT NIPP STAFFING
Pratt found that two senior staff, the Rehabilitation 
Supervisor and Assistant Supervisor, assigned from the City of 
Flint as a result of Union negotiations when the Department of 
Community Development eliminated its Rehabilitation Section, did 
not appear to answer to the Director even though they were 
responsible for directing the operations of the rehabilitation 
section. Pratt recommended that the positions be made responsible 
to the Director or transfer the employees back to the City. The 
positions were not transferred, but by retirement and a promotion 
to another City Department, by 1986, there were no City staff 
assigned to Flint NIPP.
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The Pratt study also reviewed the bid specifications prepared 
by the rehabilitation section and found concerns from both 
contractors and clients. Technical interpretation was the major 
problem. The specifications were reviewed with clients upon
implementation of the work, however, many disputes arose between 
client and contractor as to the interpretation of the work to be 
completed. Pratt found in two samples of bids submitted by 
contractors, the contractor had made amendments to the bid 
specifications, which disqualified them from consideration. Pratt 
concluded that had the changes been accepted, the job would have 
been completed in a more appropriate manner.
Pratt identified three primary factors causing the bid
specification problems: 1) incomplete initial inspection; 2)
difficulty of staying on top of changes in the industry; and 3)
gaps in various rehabilitation specialists* work experience and
205insufficient supervision by management.""
The Consultant recommended that **the development of in- 
service training programs for the staff of the rehab unit to keep 
them abreast of state-of-the-art spec writing, materials, methods, 
pricing, etc. Various construction trade associations should be 
approached to help structure and conduct these sessions. A more 
intensive and thorough initial inspection, possibly accompanied by 
a contractor, is also suggested. Furthermore, we think it is
essential for the rehab unit supervisor to exercise more diligent 
oversight. *’̂ 0G Flint NIPP, since the Pratt Report, has
implemented an up-to-date computerized specification system and a
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client-contractor orientation to ensure, to the greatest extent
possible, a better understanding of the complete rehabilitation
process and the requirements of the rehabilitation specifications.
The staffing review also found that the rehabilitation
specialists were making insufficient inspections, resulting in
2 07charges that the rehab staff ’’don’t do enough work.” Flint
NIPP also has implemented changes in this area by requiring 
documented reports detailing site inspections to client homes. 
FLINT BTPP CONTRACTORS;
Generally, the complaints against contractors evolved around 
charges that contractors and rehab specialists were ’’cozy,” 
resulting in an impression that the contractors were not properly 
supervised. Pratt suggested that the problem resulted from the 
fact that the client was viewed as a ’’consumer” rather than an 
employer since Flint NIPP bid the job, hired the contractor and 
supervised the work. Pratt recommended that the consumer become
the employer and be advised of veto power over contractor
208actions. Pratt also recommended that the Board of Directors
establish a ’’three-stage complaint resolution process: 1) staff
negotiations; 2) board grievance committee review; and 3) an 
independent, three-person arbitration panel. Ideally, the
arbitration panel should have a FNIPP-chosen member, a home-owner 
selected member, and a third member chosen by the first two,”i09 
Flint NIPP implemented this Pratt recommendation shortly after the 
Report was issued.
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The Report also identified problems related to rehabilitation 
grants. The general perception was that grant recipients did not 
receive as high a quality of work as those who received loans. 
While Pratt could not verify this situation specifically, the 
perception undermined the effects of the program. Pratt
recommended, since grants were negotiated instead of bid, that
210grants also become part of the bidding process. This
recommendation was also adopted by Flint NIPP.
CITIZEN PARTICIPATION:
Pratt cites "The Civic Park experience,” as having been the
main reason for conducting a review of Flint NIPP. The Civic Park
Project, which involved a historical preservation-rehabi1itation
pilot venture, was intended to be a joint venture between a
community based advisory committee and Flint NIPP. Pratt
identified the following interrelated factors causing the failure
21 1of the project:
an appropriate expectation by citizens of that community and 
the Advisory Committee that they would be ’’enabled” to conduct 
the restoration and preservation of these historic homes; 
FNIPP proceeding in its adopted operating style as a ’’doer,” 
disregarding provisions of its contract with the Charles 
Stewart Mott Foundation to act as an enabler; and the failure 
of C.S. Mott to enforce its contract provisions with FNIPP to 
ensure ’’meaningful participation” of Civic Park homeowners in 
the project.
The Pratt evaluation found that Flint NIPP had not been able 
to implement one of the more important recommendations of the 
White Paper issued by the Mayor Housing Task Force. The non­
profit agency should provide ’’some degree of self-determination”
212to neighborhood organizations, Pratt argued that the goals of
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the Task Force were missing from its agenda and ongoing operations
—  one of the prime reasons for the failure of the Civic Park
Project. Flint NIPP was to have been an advocate for residents,
213neighborhoods, and housing rehabilitation:
citizens do not detect this in FNIPP —  staff or board —  and 
have difficulty influencing its decisions, then questions of 
loyalty, control, ownership, representativeness, and 
accountability arise. We believe that while specific
complaints of quality of workmanship are important and in some 
instances substantive, the real complaint against FNIPP is the 
inability of citizens to influence its decisions concerning 
them, notwithstanding their limited technical knowledge of 
housing rehab and finance.
In concluding their report, The Pratt Institute found that
Flint NIPP had succumbed to political influence and should
214redirect its efforts to become part of the community:
FNIPP...has enjoyed the protection of a political godfather 
who conceived its programs, defined its goals, provided its 
resources, and sheltered it from governmental and political 
attack...Jack Litzenberg [City of FIint-Department of 
Community Development Director]... If the organization is to 
survive it is going to have to make adjustments. The chief 
adjustment is the need to find a new godfather —  a
constituency...We recommend that the board consider amending 
its charter to allow the establishment of a corporate 
membership. Such membership should be broad-based and
representative of Flint’s neighborhoods...it is a way of 
increasing FNIPP1s accountability to the citizenry...FNIPP 
will need to aggressively persuade all those who are now 
watching it that it is capable of providing a quality product 
on behalf of consumers. While the number of consumer
complaints is relatively small when compared to the total
number of projects done, the adverse publicity about those few 
has considerably undermined FNIPP’s image and public 
confidence...it is essential that outstanding complaints be 
quickly resolved...In closing, we would like to state that we 
agree with those citizens who told us that FNIPP is a needed 
organization providing a valuable service.
Flint NIPP implemented most of the Pratt recommendations
either during the time the review was being conducted or shortly 
after the final report was submitted.
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I would like, now, to make some personal observations
regarding the Pratt evaluation. I was employed as Contract
Administrator by the City of Flint’s Department of Community
Development, between August 1978 and August 1986. One of my 
responsibilities was to implement and monitor the Flint NIPP 
Agreement with the City of Flint. The Department of Community 
Development was called in many times to investigate client 
complaints. Clients’ perception, as identified in the Pratt 
Report, was that grant recipients were treated with disrespect, 
rehab specialists favored contractors, bid specifications were 
incomplete and easily misunderstood, and some contractors were not 
performing professional-quality work. Unfortunately, even though 
in a very small number of cases, all of these charges, to same 
degree, were substantiated.
The Pratt Report, however, received its greatest criticism
(although it did make for interesting press for a few days) when
it felt compelled to draw upon its New York penchant for the mafia
by identifying the Community Development Director as the
’’godfather.” The Pratt review team, essentially, misinterpreted
the close relationship between the City and Flint NIPP, Jack
Litzenberg ’’nurtured” Flint NIPP within the context of the Random
House Dictionary’s definition: "to promote the development of...to
215educate or bring up with care... something that nourishes.”
Jack Litzenberg had an even greater fault than that of being 
a ’’godfather.” —  he identified with and strongly supported a 
concept that, according to Pratt, was elusive to Flint NIPP —
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the ability to "humanize” the process by considering, immediately, 
individual interests, and, to the greater, the concept of citizen 
participation.
The City of Flint, through the encouragement of Jack
Litzenberg, had a very aggressive Citizen Participation Program. 
When CDBG legislation required the adoption of a Citizen
Participation Plan, the Department of Community Development
established The Mayor's City Wide Advisory Committee (CWAC) to act 
as "watchdog” over the CDBG program. The CWAC, taking its
responsibility very seriously, continually ensured citizen input.
The CWAC, holding an annual Town Hall Meeting, provided
information on the CDBG program, heard public comments, and 
accepted applications for CDBG funding. The CWAC established
committees that reviewed the CDBG applications and made
recommendations for funding to the City. The CWAC had the full
support of the Department of Community Development, Mayor’s 
Office, and Flint City Council. On occasion, when the City
differed with a CWAC recommendation, the City staff and CWAC 
members would negotiate a resolve to the differences.
The membership of the Committee was comprised of 9 members 
from the community at large; 2 from each of the twelve planning 
districts; 4 from public housing tenant councils; 3 members from 
each of the neighborhood strategy areas; and 1 member from each of 
the 9 wards. In the original plan, each Councilperson made the 
appointment for their ward. During the Sharp Administration, an 
Ordinance, establishing the City Wide Advisory Committee as an
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official multi-member advisory committee under the City Charter,
was adopted by the Flint City Council, After passage of the
Ordinance, all members were appointed by the Mayor and confirmed
by the Flint City Council. In March, 1989 the Collier
Administration amended the City Wide Advisory Committee Ordinance
and changed the membership structure. The amended Ordinance
restricted CWAC membership to 45 persons, with 5 members from each
P I  F iof the Citys* nine wards.
The Pratt Report somehow missed the fact that the first
Director of Flint NIFP, implementing his personal "Management By 
Objectives" method of administration, totally ignoring 
considerations of client human interest. He proceeded on the
presumption that you could run "The Corporation...like a
business." This assumption was irrespective of the fact that
service was being provided to persons of low and moderate income, 
living in substandard housing, located in deteriorating 
neighborhoods occupied predominately by minorities, and female 
headed households —  a shacking revelation taking into 
consideration the intent of the CDBG program. To his credit, 
however, is the fact that he also "nurtured" Flint NIPP, providing 
a strong administrative structure that was able to withstand and 
overcome intense criticisms. Also, by the time the Pratt Report 
was being conducted, a new Director had been appointed by the 
Flint NIPP Board of Directors. The second Flint NIPP Director had 
a greater sense for the importance of a "humanistic" approach to 
program implementation, but still developing a professionally
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oriented staff. The Third, and current Director of Flint NIPP,
has refined the suggestions from the Pratt Report, developed
initiatives of his own and improved on those of the past —  he has
the greater challenge to find Flint NIPP funding resources to
augment and eventually replace a rapidly decreasing CDBG program.
TABLE B provides a client demographic summary of those
receiving loans and grants between 1979 and 1988. Approximately
70.2 percent of Flint Nipp clients were minority, approximately
53.9 percent were female headed households, and 79.3 percent were
217small families <5 or less persons).
TABLE B 
Flint NIPP, Inc. 
CLIENT DEMOGRAPHICS 
LOANS AND GRANTS 
1979 - 1988





1988 34 102 109 2 119 13 132
1987 36 83 78 0 100 14 114
1986 52 87 83 2 121 12 133
1985 58 126 170 23 171 14 194
1984 68 141 233 12 212 23 229
1983 83 141 200 5 209 36 240
1982 19 47 69 2 63 10 261
1981 96 144 241 20 257 36 293
1980 52 97 100 20 154 27 182
1979 71 124 140 13 201 47 248
”569 1092 ”1423 99 1607_ 232 ~2026”
TABLE C summarizes the number of low income clients receiving
rehabilitation loans and grants. Approximately 87.6 percent of all





Low Income Demographics 
LOAFS AFD GRAFTS 
1979 - 1988











TOTAL 1, 175 2, 026
TABLE D reveals that between 1979 and 1988, Flint MTPP expended
61 percent for housing rehabilitation; 26 percent on Administration
(which does not reflect program activity and housing center funds






Year Rehabilitation Administrat ion Other Total Budget
1988 1,172,239 530,054 759,550 2,461,843
1987 1,079,960 469,669 546,577 2,096,206
1986 1,328,122 834,500 318,878 2,481,500
1985 1,576,885 772,539 381,127 2,730,551
1984 1,826,309 836,069 354,271 3,016,649
1983 1,903,496 782,111 304,458 2,990,065
1982 2,056,986 866,728 332,500 3,256,214
1981 2,356,253 942,736 295,230 3,594,219
1980 1,560,227 514,704 228,769 2,303,700
1979 2,133,698 686,832 110,300 2,930,830
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TABLE E breaks down, by Census Tract, the appropriation and




RECEIVING REHABILITATION GRANTS/LOANS 
1979 - 1988
CENSUS TOTAL
TRACT APPROPRIATION REHABILITATION JOBS
32 559,995 77
29 176,125 20














TABLE F summarizes the amount and 
grants issued by Flint Nipp between
number of 
1979 and




LOANS, GRANTS, LOAN/GRANTS, & PRINCIPLE—REDUCTION GRANTS
1979 - 1988
Principle—
Year Loans/ No. Grants/ No. Loan-Grants/ No. Seduct i on/ No
1988 220,282 18 78,998 13 874,612 101 0 0
1987 147,836 15 23,485 4 920,408 95 0 0
1986 187,641 17 182,838 19 967.023 97 0 0
1985 301,475 34 1,255,571 147 19,839 2 0 0
1984 215,588 28 1,493,392 188 123,670 13 0 0
1983 419,154 49 1,471,583 184 0 0 12,759 7
1982 525,642 47 1.492,761 205 6, 574 3 29,538 6
1981 630,934 50 1,670.727 228 0 0 59,636 15
1980 912,228 40 616,229 136 0 0 39,286 6
1979 811,669 31 1,238,513 187 0 0 83,515 30
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TABLE G presents the average amount of rehabilitation
assistance, 
clients.




LOANS AND GRANTS 
1979 - 1988
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
9523 8614 8370 8077 7858 7706 7928 7749 9473 8893
Flint NIPP has administered several different categories of 
Program Activities since it began in 1977. In addition to
Rehabilitation loans & Grants, Flint NIPP offers a 312 loan 
program, with funds provided from a program authorized by the 
Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, as amended.
The Purchase/Rehab/Resale Program (also called Homesteading) 
allocates funds for the purchase of vacant housing, rehabilitation 
of the structure, and then Flint Nipp puts the home on the market 
for sale to a low/mod income person who is able to qualify for a 
bank loan. The Emergency/Ramp/Hazard (emergency repairs has also 
been called interim assistance) is a program that provides funds 
for emergency repairs such as a furnace, construction of a ramp 
for the handicapped and to repair immediate hazardous conditions. 
Flint Nipp has operated special Purchase/Rehab/resale programs in 
the Hurley East and Kearsley Park areas. Rodent Control is
contracted to the Genesee County Environmental Health Office. The
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sidewalk program provides low/mod income persons with grants to 
repair damaged sidewalks. A Neighborhood Activities Program 
provided funds to Neighborhood-based organizations to carry out 
small improvement projects. A paint program provided paint and
staff provided from other public service programs to paint 
exteriors of low/mod income persons. An Investor—owner program 
provided a percentage of actual rehabilitation costs to owners of 
rental units in need or repair. A Hispanic Aide program provided 
funds to hire a bi-lingual person to translate and provide
assistance to Flint’s Hispanic Community. A clean-up program 
provided funds to neighborhood-based organizations to pick up
trash and hire a contractor to dispose of the collected material. 
An assistance to the elderly program provided funds to senior
citizens for home security or energy efficiency packages.
Flint NIPP's Housing Centers, operated in selected 
neighborhoods, provide many services. The Housing Centers have a 
complete Tool Library that loans a wide choice of tools to 
neighborhood-based organizations and individuals for minor home 
repairs and beautification projects. Housing Center staff give 
technical assistance in minor home repair, maintenance, community 
organization, and Home Maintenance Seminars that provide ’’how to- 
hands'on” classes on painting, carpentry, home security, plumbing, 
electrical work, rodent control and energy conservation.
TABLE H summarizes the various program activities required by
the contract between Flint Nipp and the City of Flint, excluding
223housing rehabilitation.
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TABLE H - Flint NIPP, Inc. Program Activities (1979 - 1988)
Year Program Activities Bo. Of Staff
1988 Purchase/Rehab/Resale; Rehab. Specialist/ 
Private Properties Program (Administrative 
Costs); Emergency Repair/Ramp/Hazard; 
Rodent Control; Kearsley Park Purchase/ 
Rehab/Resale; Housing Center Activities 
(Administrative Costs). Operated 2 
neighborhood-based housing Centers.
25
1987 Purchase/Rehab/Resale; Private Properties 
(Admin. Costs); Emergency Repair/Ramp/ 
Hazard; Rodent Control; Housing Centers 
(Admin. Costs); Sidewalk Proj. Operated 
2 neighborhood-based housing centers.
25
1986 Purchase/Rehab/Resale; Ramp/Hazard; 
Emergency Repair; Rodent Control; Neighbor­
hood Activities; Sidewalk Repair. Operated 
2 neighborhood-based housing centers.
25+ one 
loaned
1985 Purchase/Rehab/Resale; Ramp/Hazard; Emergency 
Repair; Rodent Control; Paint Project; Hispanic 
Aide (Admin. Cost); Investor-owner; Neighborhood 




1984 Purchase/Rehab/Resale; Ramp/Hazard; Emergency 
Repair; Clean-up Proj.; Paint Proj.; Hispanic 
Aide (Admin. Cost); Investor-owner; Hurley East 




1983 Purchase/Rehab/Resale; Ramp/Hazard; Emergency 
Repair; Clean-up Proj.; Paint Proj.; Hispanic 
Aide (Admin. Cost); Investor-owner. Operated 
3 neighborhood-based housing centers.
37+ 2 
loaned
1982 Homestead; Public Housing; Emergency Repair; 




1981 Homesteading; Emergency Repair; Clean-up 













COMMUMITY DEVELOPMENT BLOCK GRANT - 
CITY OF FLINT - AN ENTITLEMENT CITY
The City of Flint, upon implementing the CDBG Program, 
completed the St. John Urban Renewal Project, turning it into an 
Industrial Park. General Motors BOC acquired a large area of the 
Park for expansion. Private enterprises constructed auto industry 
related businesses and have become successful suppliers to "Buick 
City" —  a complex structured after the Japanese "Can-Ban" or
just-in-time concept. This concept allows Buick City the
advantage of not storing large quantities of parts and materials
on site. The factory is tied to a computer network that calls on
suppliers to forward the necessary parts or materials to a central 
terminal located near the Buick plant.
The City also acquired a large area of land, adjacent to 
Buick City, in the Oak Park Urban Renewal Project Area, through an 
Urban Development Action Grant, to expand the industrial park 
concept. While this area has been cleared and improvements made 
to make way for new business, the lower area of Oak Park still has 
property, some occupied, to be acquired and a plan to be developed 
for reuse.
The intent, in using CDBG funds to complete the St. John and 
Oak Urban Renewal Projects, was to eliminate two deteriorated 
neighborhoods by acquisition; relocation of mostly low income 
owners, tenants, and businesses; clearance; and redevelopment to 
increase the tax base. The City of Flint, however, was severely 
criticized by the black community and civil rights organizations
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for "impacting" other areas of the city by primarily relocating 
minorities to Northwest neighborhoods. Many of the relocated 
citizens greatly improved the quality of their housing through 
acquisition and relocation payments. However, very few breached 
existing, racially segregated housing patterns, "choosing" to 
relocate to predominately minority or racially changing 
neighborhoods —  they now find themselves living, in neglected 
declining neighborhoods, in a city that has not developed short or 
long range plans to improve its older housing stock. Since 1976,
the City of Flint having allocated over 30 million dollars to
Flint NIPP, still has not been able to stabilize neighborhoods in 
decline. Like other industrialized communities, Flint has been
unable to augment CDBG programs with general fund expenditures or 
identify other significant funding sources.
The resulting economic development benefit to low-and- 
moderate income persons, by redeveloping Urban Renewal land, using 
CDBG, Urban Development Action Grants, State, Economic Development 
Administration, and private grant funds, is questionable.
The city's initiatives to create a "tourist industry" by 
developing Autoworld, Waterstreet Pavilion, Windmill Place, 
Carriage Town, and Riverfront Center-Hyatt Regency, has
essentially failed. The "renaissance" of downtown, tied to
creating jobs, funds for housing rehabilitation, and creation of 
small minority and women—owned businesses to benefit low—and—
moderate income persons —  has been marginal.
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One project, however, that has been successful, was created
through an agreement with the developer of Waterstreet Pavilion,
The Salem Housing Task Force, operated by a neighborhood based 
organization, developed a "sweat equity” housing rehabilitation 
program. They require those who choose homeownership to provide 
their labor to help rehabilitate vacant homes the Task Force has 
acquired from private and publicly owned sources. The Salem 
Housing Task Force has been able to develop a viable program even 
though starting with a much smaller base of financial support than 
Flint NIPP. Since 1986, they have been successful in increasing 
their support from the City of Flint’s CDBG program. It will take 
creative leadership and greater citizen involvement to develop a 
long range plan to improve Flint’s neighborhoods.
The City Wide Advisory Committee (CWAC) has been able to keep 
the CDBG program focused on benefit to low-and-moderate income 
persons. Critics of the citizen participation process, created 
under the CDBG program, have not been successful in promoting
other methods to ensure citizen input. Apparent apathy on the
part of Flint citizens to participate in annual Town Hall 
Meetings, a lack of ability to develop political support to 
influence Mayoral and City Council decisions, and declining 
professional planning resources placed the responsibility of 
steering the CDBG program on the CWAC.
It is too soon to tell if the restructuring of the CWAC, the 
recently created Mayor’s Office on Neighborhoods, creation of a 
county-wide economic development organization, and redevelopment
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of the old General Motors Fisher plant will have any impact on 
declining neighborhoods and benefit low-and-moderate income 
persons.
The City of Flint has consistently met federally mandated 
obligations by concentrating the CDBG resources to the inner city, 
public services demonstrating the greatest need, and economic 
development loans to minority and women-owned businesses that 
would not have been given business-start opportunities without 
government assistance. Unlike other communities, that directed 
their CDBG funds to census tracts of questionable need to make its 
projects appear successful, Flint allocated funds to Neighborhood 
Strategy Areas of greatest need and concentration of low-and- 
moderate- income persons. This philosophy, however, after the
first two years of Flint NIPP programming, also created a 
rehabilitation program that was spread too thin to make a 
significant impact on inner city neighborhoods. During the two 
years, after formation of Flint NIPP, infrastructure improvements 
such as street resurfacing, and installation of new curb and 
gutter, was included in selected rehabilitation areas. The City, 
primarily because of political considerations, increased the 
number of Neighborhood Strategy Areas, while CDBG allocations were 
decreasing, thus causing the overall impact of its efforts to 
decline. Flint Nipp attempted to turn this around, somewhat, by 
requiring a certain portion of the rehabilitation loan or grant to 
be expended for exterior residential improvement. A large portion 
of a grant or loan is expended on critical improvements such as
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plumbing and electrical systems which does nothing to improve the 
visual aspects of a neighborhood in decline —  essentially 
becoming a limited maintenance of effort.
Mot only the City of Flint, but all communities involved in 
attempts to improve their inner cities, through rehabilitation, 
must look to alternative funding resources.
One possible financial tool, currently authorized in over 30
states, is Tax Increment Financing (TIF) . The State Df Michigan
has adopted two laws that address Tax Increment Financing, In
1975, The Downtown Development Authority <DDA) Act, Public Act
197, was enacted. P.A. 197 allows local units of government to
2 2 4-form separate DDA Authorities. The legislation allows DDA’s to
undertake a broad range of downtown improvement projects which 
will contribute to the economic growth and the halting of 
deterioration of property values in a designated downtown 
district. Improvement activities include, but are not limited 
to planning and proposing the construction, renovation, 
repair, remodeling, rehabilitation, restoration or
reconstruction of public facilities, existing buildings, or 
multi-family dwelling facilities; development of long-range 
plans; and otherwise implement any plan of development in the 
downtown district necessary to achieve the purposes of the 
statute.
In 1980, The Tax Increment Financing Act, Public Act 197, was 
passed. P.A. 197 can only be used by local municipal governmental 
units to form one Tax Increment Financing Authority.
The Tax Increment Financing mechanism allows local units of
government to ’’freeze” current State Equalized Values (SEV) of
property in TIFA districts and ’’capture” any increases in the SEV.
The ’’captured” tax revenue then is used to finance ’’brick and
225mortar” improvements within the District.w  ̂ Mew revenue then can
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either be allocated as it is produced or borrowed against through 
a bond issue.
Until recently, TIFA Districts were used to fund large 
downtown projects, such as the Hyatt Regency Hotel in downtown 
Flint, Neighborworks organizations, operating Neighborhood
Preservation Projects through Neighborhood Housing Services
(NHS*s), has had some success in utilizing the TIFA District
. 227 concept.
TIFA Districts have helped revitalize neighborhoods and
improve properties through rehabilitation of single family and
multifamily dwellings and apartments. The improved neighborhoods
bring property values up, thus creating extra tax revenue within
228the District to fund additional improvements.
In Sacramento, California a neighborhood improvement project 
overlaps part of the city’s Oak Park development district. The 
district generates approximately $800,000 per year in tax
increment funds. The City allocates $300,000 plus $75,000 in TIF 
revenue to support a revolving loan fund and partially support the 
operating budget. Also, in this same Sacramento TIF District,
revenue has been used to install street lighting, sidewalk, and
229landscaping improvements.
Another successful TIF District is located in Great Falls, 
Montana. The revenue generated in the district supports a zero 
interest loan to provide interim financing for infill construction 
of affordable single-family housing. Also, TIF revenue, in Great 
Falls, has financed a storm drain system to prevent flooding. TIF
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Districts have also been developed in Rockford, Illinois and St.
Paul, Minnesota.
According to one TIFA expert, ’'Essentially, TIF-funded
development pays its own way” while increasing the amount of
property taxes paid to local government because of improvement and
231new construction projects.
While a TIFA District is one option, the City of Flint must 
also look at the overall delivery of rehabilitation services to 
declining, and marginal neighborhoods. Political considerations 
aside, which, admittedly is not easy, Flint must look at reducing 
the number of Neighborhood Strategy Areas (NSA), Short and long 
range planning strategies, for improving Flint’s neighborhoods, 
need to be developed. The strategy must include the entire NSA, 
not just individual residential structures, and prioritization of 
infrastructure improvements.
This kind of planning strategy will require strong leadership 
from the City of Flint and the cooperative efforts of banking and 
lending institutions, politicians, planners, and residents of the 
various neighborhoods —  the age of uncertainty, which began in 
the mid 80’s, is still with us. The Community Development Block 
Grant Program can no longer be counted on to support Flint Nipp 
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